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1Preface
Standard financial economic theory has increasingly been criticized since the advent
of the most recent financial crisis. Obviously it was not designed to address some of
the most important issues in finance. Many sceptics even believe that there is a need
for a radical overhaul, since the theory is built on clearly unrealistic assumptions and
struggles to explain various empirical facts.
Do we truly need a completely new theory? What exactly does the existing theory
already explain? Which of its features should we keep? One might be led to suspect
that the shortcomings of the theory are evident and to focus more on the search for
improvements. However, sometimes it is difficult to know right from wrong and tricky
to identify the problematic parts of a model. Seemingly problematic assumptions might
still be justified and seemingly unproblematic approaches might come with some hidden
pitfalls. This thesis contributes to the discussion by presenting three new at first sight
surprising results.
The representative agent is an example of an assumption that has been harshly
criticized ever since its introduction.1 It nonetheless seems to be a widely accepted
framework to study asset prices and the most prominent models in consumption-
based asset pricing build on this assumption.2 Thus, while many researchers suggest
completely abandoning the representative agent, there is still a big community believing
in it. Though one has to say that even advocates of the representative agent disagree on
1For different points of criticism see Hartley (1996) and Kirman (1992).
2See Barro (2006), Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
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how the objective function should look like: at the center of the debate lies the question
whether the representative agent should be perfectly rational or exhibit behavioral
traits.
From a theoretical point of view, the representative-agent approach is hard to justify
and supportive analytical results require quite restrictive assumptions.3 Chapter 2
looks at the representative agent from a different angle and takes the discussion to
a new theoretical framework called evolutionary finance. Evolutionary finance is a
relatively young field of theoretical finance and takes up concepts from evolutionary
biology. Financial markets are regarded as an environment where different populations
of investment strategies compete for capital. The aim is to gain a better understanding of
population dynamics and their impact on financial markets. An evolutionary approach
to finance opens up new possibilities for analyzing and interpreting the representative
agent.
Chapter 2 employs an evolutionary finance model in the sense of Evstigneev et al.
(2016). All agents are assumed to invest according to simple rebalancing rules and to
consume the same fraction of wealth. In this simple model, aggregate consumption
alone already fails to explain asset prices. Suppose that there are two investors and
two assets. Investor 1 invests a higher percentage of wealth into asset A, whereas
investor 2 invests a higher percentage of wealth into asset B. Without knowing the
wealth distribution between the two investors we would not even know whether the
aggregate demand for asset A or B is higher and which asset sells at a higher price.
The search for a representative agent that does not account for the wealth distribution
seems pointless in our model. Chapter 2 argues that the definition of a representative
agent might still make sense depending on what we intend to explain. There might
be no representative agent explaining actual price levels, but one explaining other
interesting features of asset prices. In fact, the setup in Chapter 2 allows specifying a
representative agent that generates relative prices to which actual relative asset prices
tend to in expectation. The respective representative agent maximizes a logarithmic
3See for example Rubinstein (1974) and Constantinides (1982).
2
utility function no matter which investment strategies are present in the market and
how much wealth is initially allocated to them.
How come that the relative asset prices tend towards the same relative prices in
expectation for any set of rebalancing rules? The intuition is as follows. The influence of
an individual on prices depends on an individual’s wealth. While investment strategies
that drive up the price of overpriced assets suffer from a low dividend yield, strategies
investing into underpriced assets benefit from a high dividend yield. The relative wealth
and thus price influence of the former strategies therefore decreases. This leads to
a slight correction in prices, which further decreases their price influence. All prices
therefore tend to move towards a level where the expected returns on all assets corrected
for the impact of consumption on wealth are the same. The logarithmic utility function
of the representative agent is a consequence of the assumption that investors consume
a constant fraction of wealth.
To summarize, Chapter 2 shows how evolutionary finance can provide new tools
to reassess and tackle aggregation. The evolutionary approach focuses on identifying
and studying the impact of different evolutionary forces. In Chapter 2, one particular
market stabilizing force is identified which favors the meaningful formulation of a
representative agent. It should serve as a motivation for further research to search
for other evolutionary forces and to study their joint effects in order to gain a better
understanding of the applicability and functional form of the representative agent.4
Chapter 3 refers to another debatable practice in consumption-based asset pricing.
Often there are approximations needed to obtain tractable forms in the hope that the
error is negligibly small. Though, sometimes even arbitrarily small terms can contain
useful information. Chapter 3 provides such an example and discusses the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) as an approximation to the consumption capital asset pricing
model (CCAPM) in case of power utility and lognormally distributed dividends. This
approximation is quite common because there are no closed-form solutions available for
4For example an opposing evolutionary force has been identified by Brock and Hommes (1998). They
find that the presence of investors that switch between different investment strategies can lead to chaotic
asset price dynamics.
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this specification of the CCAPM. Another reason for its widespread use is that a linear
pricing rule like the CAPM was important for estimation before the development of the
generalized method of moments.5 Campbell and Viceira (2002) as well as Herings and
Kübler (2007) show that the differences between the CAPM and the CCAPM are in fact
small which partially justifies the approximation. Chapter 3 takes the view that even
though the differences are small, they still deserve some attention: They might shed
some light on possible reasons for the appearance of CAPM-anomalies like the low-beta,
the value and the small-size premium.6
Chapter 3 studies a special case of the CCAPM with power utility and lognormally
distributed dividends. An additional distributional assumption, which is motivated by
empirical evidence, allows to solve the model in closed form.7 This makes a deeper
analysis of the differences between the CAPM and the CCAPM possible. Chapter 3
shows that using the CAPM as an approximation to the CCAPM leads to a low-beta,
a value and a small-size premium. A closer look at the pricing error of the CAPM
reveals that these premia increase with the coefficient of relative risk aversion and with
consumption volatility. The similarities between cross-sectional puzzles and the equity
premium puzzle8 are striking. Both are predicted by the CCAPM with power utility and
lognormal dividends, but the predictions are too small in size. Moreover, the size of
both increase with risk aversion and consumption risk.
The insights of Chapter 3 may help in the search for explanations of cross-sectional
anomalies. Knowing more about the nature of a problem shapes the way we think
about possible solutions. Take for example the equity premium puzzle: The fact that
the high equity premium is merely a quantitative puzzle and that its size crucially
depends on the coefficient of relative risk aversion and consumption risk has led the
research community to focus mainly on explanations based on alternative preferences
5See Cochrane (2001).
6These three CAPM-anomalies were first discovered by Black et al. (1972), Basu (1977) and Banz
(1981).
7We assume that dividends are lognormally distributed in the cross-section as empirically documented
by Elmiger (2010).
8See Mehra and Prescott (1985).
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and additional consumption risk.9 The results in Chapter 3 motivate taking a similar
approach to cross-sectional anomalies and searching for a joint explanation to the equity
premium puzzle and cross-sectional puzzles.
Chapter 4 takes up the literature on rare disasters. Rare disasters may be an
explanation for the high equity premium as well as various other asset pricing puzzles.10
The term rare disasters refers to large drops in consumption that occur only around
once in a hundred years for example due to war. The literature on rare disasters argues
that the timespan of currently available consumption data is too short to properly reflect
the risk for such events. Thus, consumption risk is actually much higher than suggested
by data and justifies the high equity premium.
The effect of rare disasters impressively demonstrates how sensitive this type of
model reacts to distributional assumptions. A once-in-a-century event can have a big
impact on the model outcome. In fact, incorporating rare disasters not only changes
quantitative results, but can even alter qualitative results of the model. Chapter 4 shows
such an example and discusses the predictability of stock returns with the labor income
to consumption ratio: A change in the risk for a rare disaster can flip the sign of the
stock return predictability.11
What is the intuition behind this result? Let us start with the case of no or small
disaster risk. In this case, there is a negative relation between the labor income to
consumption ratio and expected stock returns. The reason is that labor income is
relatively stable compared to capital income. When the labor income to consumption
ratio is high, there is only little covariation between stock returns and consumption.
Therefore the required return on stocks to compensate for risk is low. In contrast, stock
returns and the labor income to consumption ratio become positively related when the
risk for a rare disaster is high. Labor income in this case becomes more risky, which
9For prominent such approaches see for example Barro (2006), Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Campbell
and Cochrane (1999).
10See for example Rietz (1988), Barro (2006) and Gabaix (2012).
11The given example is motivated by the empirical findings of Santos and Veronesi (2006) and Chen
and Joslin (2012). They observe a negative relation between stock returns and the labor income to
consumption ratio prior to the nineties and a positive relation afterwards.
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leads to a diversification effect. If the labor income to consumption ratio is already high,
there is less diversification in total income as the labor income to consumption ratio
increases. As a consequence, the required return on stocks decreases.
Distributional assumptions can undoubtedly have unexpected and far-reaching
consequences for consumption-based asset pricing results. An appropriately accurate
estimation of the underlying distributions is therefore crucial. This poses a particular
challenge to some currently suggested resolutions for the high equity premium as well
as other asset pricing puzzles, since they heavily rely on difficult to verify distributional
assumptions.
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2A Heterogeneous-Agent Foundation of the
Representative-Agent Approach
The stochastic discount factor is a key concept in the equilibrium asset pricing literature.
It allows pricing assets solely by the contribution of their cash flows to aggregate
consumption growth. A broad class of asset pricing models based on the stochastic
discount factor approach are able to replicate various stylized facts about asset prices.12
Apparently this approach achieves some empirical successes, even though the theoretical
motivation for the full determination of the stochastic discount factor by macroeonomic
variables relies on very restrictive assumptions. Either one directly assumes that asset
prices are generated by a single representative agent maximizing utility on an aggregate
budget set or one assumes that markets are complete and all agents have perfect
foresight (see Constantinides (1982)). This chapter provides a theoretical foundation
for the use of a representative agent based on a heterogeneous-agent model with not
necessarily complete markets and market participants that have no knowledge about
the future. We analyze a financial market model in discrete time where agents invest
according to simple rebalancing rules. Asset prices therefore depend on the distribution
of wealth across individual agents and cannot solely be explained by their cash flows
and macroeconomic aggregates in general. However, the direction in which relative
asset prices are expected to move in the next period conditional on past information can
be determined using a stochastic discount factor generated by a simple representative
12For example habit-formation (see Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), long-run risk (see Bansal and
Yaron (2004)) and rare disaster models (see Barro (2006)).
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agent. We prove analytically that all relative asset prices are expected to move in this
direction in the case of two types of agents and two assets. Our simulation results
suggest that this property carries over for the majority of assets in the case of more than
two types of agents and more than two assets.
The special case with two types of agents and two assets illustrates the intuition
behind the results. In the model, all agents have a price impact and asset prices are
driven by the relative wealth dynamics. Suppose that one type of agents has a very high
demand for one asset compared to the other so that the price of one asset compared
to the future stream of dividends is much higher than of the other. The price impact
of this type of agents decreases compared to the price impact of the other agents as
dividends are paid, because they hold more of the overpriced asset and earn a lower
return than the other agents. In a market with several assets and types of agents, there
can be cross-effects so that the mechanism identified in the model with two types of
agents and two assets does not always work. However, our simulations suggest that
this market force is stronger than the cross-effects in case of most assets.
Some closely related arguments for the representative-agent approach have been
brought up by the existing literature. An alternative hypothesis based on thoughts
by Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953) is that there exists a dominant investment
strategy in terms of profits driving all other strategies out of the market in the long
run. It is debatable whether such a dominant strategy actually exists or whether the
best long-run performance can be achieved by different investment strategies.13 Even if
there was a dominant strategy, it is unclear how much time it would take until other
strategies are driven out of the market. The literature on market selection mainly
provides asymptotic results that are difficult to interpret in this respect.14 Our results
suggest that independently of the presence of a dominant strategy the direction in
which relative asset prices are expected to move from one time period to the next can
be found using a representative agent.
13For economies where the market selection hypothesis fails see for example Blume and Easley (2006)
and Borovicˇka (2015).
14For a survey on market selection and asset pricing see for example Blume and Easley (2009).
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Another argument first brought up by Muth (1961) is that non-systematic mistakes
in the assessment of future outcomes across individuals cancel on average. Aggregate
market behavior can therefore still be determined by the behavior of a single agent fully
knowledgeable about the true distribution of future outcomes. However, individual
mistakes are unlikely to cancel on average given the systematic biases identified by the
behavioural finance literature.15 We show that even if all individuals use rebalancing
rules that over- or underinvest into an asset, relative wealth dynamics still tend to push
relative asset prices in expectation closer towards the relative prices of a representative-
agent model with perfect foresight.
This chapter analyzes an evolutionary finance model in the style of Evstigneev et al.
(2016).16 The main advantages of this modelling approach is that common restrictive
assumptions like utility functions, perfect foresight and market completeness are not
imposed. Market participants are directly characterized by their investment rules rather
than by utility functions. Investment rules can therefore follow from utility maximization
but do not need to. Previous research in this framework focuses on identifying portfolio
rules that survive and/or dominate in the long run.17 Almost sure convergence to
a single investment strategy present in the market, which invests proportionally to
discounted expected relative dividends, is shown under different assumptions on the
initial set of investment strategies and on dividend processes.18 Compared to these
asymptotic studies, our paper focuses on expected relative wealth and price dynamics
over one time period and our results hold independently of the presence of a dominant
strategy. We find that relative prices are expected to move closer to the relative prices
under the discounted-expected-relative-dividend-strategy over one time period even in
the absence of this investment strategy.
15See Daniel et al. (2002), Barber and Odean (2011) and references therein for common biases of
market participants.
16More specifically, it is a special case of the setting in Amir et al. (2011).
17For related results within the utility-maximizing framework see for example Sandroni (2000), Blume
and Easley (2006) and Borovicˇka (2015).
18For results on global convergence see Amir et al. (2005) and Evstigneev et al. (2008). For results on
local convergence see Evstigneev et al. (2006) and Evstigneev et al. (2011).
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The only other study within the evolutionary finance framework in the sense of
Evstigneev et al. (2016) that treats the case of no dominant strategy present in the
market is the dissertation of Giachini (2015). Chapter 3 addresses short- and medium-
term dynamics, whereas Chapter 2 and 4 provide asymptotic analyses.19 The main
difference between the one-period analysis of Chapter 3 and our study is that Giachini
(2015) examines the differences in expected next-period relative prices conditional on
current dividends given the same relative price, whereas we analyze expected next-
period relative prices conditional on current relative prices. The results cannot be
compared due to different assumptions on dividends. Neither model is a special case of
the other.20
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2.1 introduces the evolutionary
finance model with heterogeneous agents. Section 2.2 states the representative-agent
benchmark. Section 2.3 presents analytical results for the case of two strategies and
two assets and simulation results for different numbers of strategies and assets.
2.1 The Heterogeneous-Agent Model
The model is set in discrete time t = 0,1, . . . There is an arbitrary number of market
participants who can invest into K > 1 long-lived financial assets. The total number of
different investment strategies implemented by market participants is given by I ≥ K .
2.1.1 Financial assets
The K financial assets are characterized by an exogenously given asset supply and
dividend payments. The two stochastic processes {Vt,k}∞t=0 and {Dt,k}∞t=0 describe the
supply and dividend payments of asset k ∈ {1, . . . , K} at each point in time. Both
stochastic processes are defined over a probability space (Ω,F ,P ), where Ω is the
19Chapter 2 discusses conditions for the long-term co-existence of investment strategies and Chapter 4
discusses the wisdom of crowds in prediction markets.
20Both our analytical results are derived in the case of two investment strategies and two assets.
Giachini (2015) restricts the analysis to two states of the world and treats the case of Arrow securities,
whereas we assume that relative dividends are martingales.
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sample space, F is a filtration and P is the probability measure, and take finite values
in
 
R+,B

. Each asset always remains in positive supply
Vt,k > 0 for k = 1, . . . , K , t = 0,1, . . . ,
and at least one asset pays a positive dividend each period,
K∑
k=1
Dt,k > 0 for t = 0, 1, . . .
Let Dt ≡ (Dt,1, ..., Dt,K)′ denote the vector with dividend payments of all assets at time
t. The evolutionary finance model is better tractable when stated in relative terms. We
therefore define the relative dividends of asset k ∈ {1, . . . , K} as
dt,k ≡ Dt,kVt,k∑K
l=1 Dt,l Vt,l
.
The price of asset k, pt,k, is endogeneously determined. We will show that {pt,k}∞t=0 is a
positive real-valued stochastic process on (Ω,F ,P ). The vector of asset prices at time
t is denoted as pt ≡ (pt,1, ..., pt,K)′.
2.1.2 Investment strategies
The I different investment strategies are characterized by the fraction of wealth invested
into financial assets and by the proportions invested into the K financial assets. The
real-valued adapted process {αit}∞t=0 denotes the fraction of wealth that strategy i invests
into financial assets at time t and satisfies 0 < αit < 1. Put differently, the fraction
(1− αit) denotes the consumption rate at time t of investors following strategy i. In
addition we exclude the possibility of large asset repurchases (see Assumption 2.1).
Assumption 2.1 Investment rates are bounded by asset supply growth, i.e.
max
i=1,...,I
αit < mink=1,...,K
Vt,k
Vt−1,k
for t = 0, 1, . . .
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From the total amount of wealth invested into financial assets, strategy i invests a
fraction λit,k into asset k at time t. We define λ
i
t ≡ (λit,1, . . . ,λit,K) to be the vector of
investment proportions from strategy i at time t and assume investment proportions to
be Ft-measurable. Thus, investors base their decisions on any available present and
past information. The investment proportions must sum up to one:
K∑
k=1
λit,k = 1 for t = 0,1, . . . , i = 1, . . . , I ,
and there is a positive demand for each asset throughout time:
I∑
i=1
λit,k > 0 for t = 0, 1, . . . , k = 1, . . . , K .
In addition, we assume that no short-selling occurs (see Assumption 2.2).
Assumption 2.2 There are no short-selling investment strategies, i.e. λit > 0 for all
i = 1, . . . , I at each point in time.
Let us define x it,k as the number of assets k that investment strategy i holds in the
portfolio at time t. The vector x it ≡ (x it,1, . . . , x it,K)′ denotes the portfolio holdings of
strategy i at time t. The total wealth allocated to strategy i at time t is defined as
w it ≡ 〈Dt + pt , x it−1〉, where 〈., .〉 denotes the scalar product of the two vectors. For the
formulation of the model in relative terms, we define the relative wealth of strategy i at
time t as
r it ≡
w it∑I
j=1 w
j
t
.
The wealth of all strategies remains positive at each point in time since the investment
rate and prices are positive and no short-selling takes place. Therefore, relative wealth
is always well-defined and satisfies 0 < r it < 1. The vector rt ≡ (r1t , . . . , r It )′ denotes
the relative wealth shares of all investors at time t.
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2.1.3 Dynamic equilibrium
Suppose that each investment strategy i starts with a positive amount of wealth and is
initially endowed with x i−1 > 0. All financial assets are traded each period. Prices are
endogeneously determined by the market clearing conditions at time t = 0,1, . . .:
pt,kVt,k =
I∑
i=1
λit,kα
i
t〈Dt + pt , x it−1〉, k = 1, ..., K . (2.1)
While the supply of each asset, consumption rates, investment proportions and dividends
are exogeneously given, asset holdings at time t = 0, 1 . . . are determined by
x it,k =
λit,kα
i
t〈Dt + pt , x it−1〉
pt,k
, i = 1, . . . , I , k = 1, . . . , K . (2.2)
Note that all exogeneously given variables are Ft-measurable, which implies that
the processes {pt,k}∞t=0 and {w it}∞t=0, where w it = 〈Dt + pt , x it−1〉, are adapted as well.
Furthermore, the appendix shows that the equations in (2.1) uniquely determine asset
prices and that prices are positive. The equations in (2.2) are therefore well-defined.
2.1.4 Relative wealth dynamics
The relative wealth dynamics of the evolutionary finance model are more convenient
to work with than the random dynamical system defined by the equations (2.1) and
(2.2). Before stating them, let us introduce two simplifying assumptions that we impose
throughout the remainder of this chapter.
Assumption 2.3 The supply of all assets remains constant over time, i.e. Vt,k = Vk for all
k = 1, . . . , K and t = 0, 1, . . ..
Assumption 2.4 All investors have the same constant investment rate, i.e. αit = α for
i = 1, . . . , I and t = 0,1, . . ..
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Now let us state the relative wealth dynamics in this setting. The relative wealth
at time t = 0 follows directly from the initial endowments and the market clearing
condition (2.1). Given r i0 > 0 for all investment strategies i, the relative wealth
dynamics are implicitly given by
r it =
K∑
k=1
 
(1−α)dt,k +α〈λt,k, rt〉
 λit−1,kr it−1
〈λt−1,k, rt−1〉 , (2.3)
where i = 1, . . . , I and t = 1,2, . . .. The derivation of the relative wealth dynamics is
in the appendix.21 Since dividends are non-negative and asset holdings as well as asset
prices are positive, the relative wealth dynamics are well-defined.
2.2 The Representative-Agent Benchmark
A representative-agent model with a logarithmic utility maximizer will serve us as a
benchmark for comparison with the evolutionary finance model. The decision problem
of the representative agent is given as
max{x t}∞t=0
E
 ∞∑
t=0
δt log
 
ct

s.t. ct +
K∑
k=1
pt,k x t,k =
K∑
k=1
 
pt,k + Dt,k

x t−1,k,
where t = 0,1, . . . and x−1,k for k = 1, . . . , K are given. Here δ denotes the time
discount factor, ct denotes consumption at time t, x t,k denotes the number of assets k
in the portfolio of the representative agent at time t, pt,k denotes the price of asset k at
time t and Dt,k denotes the dividend of asset k at time t. In equilibrium all markets clear:
x∗t,k = Vk for k = 1, . . . , K and c∗t =
∑K
k=1 Dt,kVk for t = 0, 1, . . ., where Vk denotes the
exogenously given supply of asset k.
21Amir et al. (2011) derive the relative wealth dynamics in a more general setting with a time-varying
investment rate and time-varying asset supply growth.
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Asset prices in the representative-agent model are given by
p∗t,k = Et
 ∞∑
τ=1
δτ
∑K
l=1 Dt,l Vl∑K
m=1 Dt+τ,mVm
Dt+τ,k

, (2.4)
where k = 1, . . . , K and t = 0,1, . . .. The aggregate market capitalization is
K∑
k=1
p∗t,kVk =
K∑
k=1
Et
 ∞∑
τ=1
δτ
∑K
l=1 Dt,l Vl∑K
m=1 Dt+τ,mVm
Dt+τ,k

Vk =
δ
1−δ
K∑
l=1
Dt,l Vl , (2.5)
where t = 0,1, . . .. To better illustrate the connection between this model and the
evolutionary finance model, let us also calculate the investment rate and the investment
proportions of the representative agent in equilibrium. The investment rate is given by
α =
∑K
k=1 p
∗
t,kVk∑K
l=1

p∗t,l + Dt,l

Vl
=
δ
1−δ
∑K
k=1 Dt,kVk
δ
1−δ + 1
∑K
l=1 Dt,l Vl
= δ. (2.6)
Thus, the investment rate equals exactly the discount factor. The fraction of wealth
after consumption invested into asset k at time t is
λ∗t,k =
p∗t,kVk
δ
∑K
l=1

p∗t,l + Dt,l

Vl
=
Et
h∑∞
τ=1δ
τ
∑K
l=1 Dt,l Vl∑K
m=1 Dt+τ,mVm
Dt+τ,k
i
Vk
δ

δ
1−δ + 1
∑K
l=1 Dt,l Vl
= Et
 ∞∑
τ=1
(1−δ)δτ−1dt+τ,k

. (2.7)
The representative-agent model with a logarithmic utility maximizer is equivalent to an
evolutionary finance model with only one investment strategy present in the market
characterized by an investment rate of δ and investment proportions {λ∗t}∞t=0 as pointed
out by Gerber et al. (2010) and Hens et al. (2011).22 The following shows that asset
22For a comparison of the two models in case of independently and identically distributed dividends
see Gerber et al. (2010). Hens et al. (2011) refer to the model specification used in our paper and state
relative prices. We contribute to their comparison by comparing investment rates and absolute prices.
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prices are indeed the same in both models. The market capitalization of asset k at time
t in the respective evolutionary finance model is given by
pt,kVk = λ
∗
t,kα〈Dt + pt , x t−1〉. (2.8)
Since the λ∗-strategy is the only investment strategy present in the market, the wealth
of the λ∗-strategy, which is wt = 〈Dt + pt , x t−1〉, equals aggregate wealth. Aggregate
wealth equals aggregate dividends plus aggregate market capitalization. The aggregate
market capitalization in the evolutionary finance model follows from summing up (2.1)
over all k = 1, . . . , K and noting that x t−1 = Vk:
K∑
k=1
pt,kVk =
α
1−α
K∑
k=1
Dt,kVk,
where t = 0,1, . . .. Thus, aggregate wealth is given by
K∑
k=1
Dt,kVk +
K∑
k=1
pt,kVk =
1
1−α
K∑
k=1
Dt,kVk. (2.9)
Inserting aggregate wealth (2.9) and λ∗t,k as defined in (2.7) into the expression for the
market capitalization (2.8), we obtain
pt,kVk = λ
∗
t,k
α
1−α
K∑
l=1
Dt,l Vl =
α
1−αEt
 ∞∑
τ=1
(1−δ)δτ−1
∑K
l=1 Dt,l Vl∑K
m=1 Dt+τ,mVm
Dt+τ,kVk

.
Dividing by Vk and noting that the investment rate equals the discount factor as shown
in (2.6), we obtain
pt,k = Et
 ∞∑
τ=1
δτ
∑K
l=1 Dt,l Vl∑K
m=1 Dt+τ,mVm
Dt+τ,k

.
Hence prices are the same as implied by utility maximization (see (2.4)).
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For the comparison of the model with a representative logarithmic utility maximizer
to the evolutionary finance model with multiple rebalancing rules, we make another
simplifying assumption that concerns relative dividends.23
Assumption 2.5 Relative dividends are martingales, i.e. the conditional expectation of
relative dividends is Et[dt+1,k] = dt,k for k = 1, . . . , K and t = 0,1, . . ..
This assumption takes up the fact that managers tend to be reluctant to change dividend
payouts. Lowering dividends could signal bad performance to the market, whereas
an increase in dividends would make it more difficult to sustain the higher level of
dividend payouts.24
Assuming that relative dividends are martingales, the proportions of wealth after
consumption that the representative agent invests into asset k at time t becomes
λ∗t,k = dt,k.
When we compare the cross-section of asset prices between the two models, it will be
more convenient to move to relative terms. Instead of asset prices, we will focus our
discussion on relative market capitalizations:
q∗t,k =
p∗t,kVk∑K
l=1 p
∗
t,l Vl
= Et
 ∞∑
τ=1
(1−δ)δτ−1dt+τ,k

= λ∗t,k,
where k = 1, . . . , K and t = 0,1, . . .. In case of relative dividends being martingales,
we obtain that relative market capitalizations equal relative dividends
q∗t,k = dt,k.
23Note that we only impose an assumption on relative dividends which is weaker than a respective
assumption on absolute dividends.
24These arguments were first identified by Lintner (1956) from interviews with managers about their
dividend policies. For a more recent survey see Brav et al. (2005).
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2.3 Asset Prices in the Evolutionary Finance Model
Asset prices in the evolutionary finance model are in general different from the ones
in the representative-agent model with a logarithmic utility maximizer. In fact, the
relative market capitalizations depend on the different investment strategies present in
the market and the distribution of relative wealth across investment strategies:
qt,k =
I∑
i=1
λit,kr
i
t ,
where k = 1, . . . , K and t = 0, 1, . . .. Asset prices can therefore not be explained by any
model that does not take into account information about the cross-section.
Recall that we assume the same consumption and savings behavior across agents.25
The cross-sectional wealth distribution has therefore no impact on the aggregate market
capitalization:26
K∑
k=1
pt,kVk =
α
1−α
K∑
k=1
Dt,kVk,
where t = 0, 1, . . .. We see that the aggregate market capitalization equals discounted
expected future aggregate dividends and is the same as in the representative-agent
model (2.5) at each point in time.27
Does the dependence of prices on cross-sectional information exclude a meaningful
specification of a representative agent? We show that this is not generally true. Even
though a representative-agent model cannot explain actual price levels, it still provides
valuable information about asset prices: It indicates the direction in which relative asset
prices tend to move in expectation.
25See Assumption 2.4.
26The aggregate market capitalization follows from summing up (2.1) over all k = 1, . . . , K and noting
that
∑I
i=1 x
i
t−1 = Vk for t = 0,1, . . ..
27This follows from the fact that the investment rate of the representative logarithmic utility maximizer
equals the discount factor as shown in (2.6).
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For the following analysis we assume that relative dividends are martingales and
that strategies invest fixed proportions of wealth into assets, i.e. Assumption 2.5 and
Assumption 2.6 hold.
Assumption 2.6 The investment proportions of all strategies are constant over time, i.e.
λit = λ
i for i = 1, . . . , I and t = 0,1, . . ..
Assumption 2.6 means that we focus on the implications of relative wealth dynamics
on asset prices and we exclude possible effects from investors revising their investment
proportions.
2.3.1 Two investment strategies and two financial assets
First we examine the case of two investment strategies and two financial assets. For
this case we prove that the relative market capitalizations of both assets move closer to
the respective relative market capitalizations of the representative-agent model from
Section 2.2 in expectation. Since we assume investment strategies to invest according
to constant proportions of wealth, relative wealth dynamics must be the sole driver of
our results.
For a precise statement of the results some more notation is needed. We define the
relative wealth levels r1∗t and r2∗t as the ones at which the relative market capitalization of
each asset corresponds to the one derived from the decision problem of a representative
expected logarithmic utility maximizer. Put differently, r1∗t and r2∗t are the relative
wealth levels at which the resulting representative agent in the evolutionary finance
model invests according to λ∗t :
qt,k =
2∑
i=1
λikr
i∗
t = λ
∗
t,k = dt,k = q
∗
t,k, where k = 1,2.
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Note that there exist such relative wealth levels if and only ifr1∗t
r2∗t
 =
λ11 λ21
λ12 λ
2
2
−1dt,1
dt,2
 = 1
λ11λ
2
2 −λ21λ12
λ22dt,1 −λ21dt,2
λ11dt,2 −λ12dt,1
 (2.10)
is positive. This is the case if and only if λ11 > dt,1 > λ
2
1 or λ
1
1 < dt,1 < λ
2
1 or if one
of the two strategies invests according to λ∗t . Suppose that both strategies invest more
(less) into the same asset compared to the λ∗t -strategy. In this case, relative prices
can never reach the equilibrium prices of the representative-agent model. The closest
relative prices can get is when the strategy closer to the λ∗t -strategy owns all wealth.
Apparently relative wealth can reach a level where the representative agent invests
according to the λ∗t -strategy if and only if the two strategies do not simultaneously
invest more (less) than the λ∗t -strategy. Moreover, relative wealth shares are expected
to move closer to these levels in this case as stated in Theorem 2.1. Theorem 2.1
also says that there is no overshooting in expectation. If the relative wealth share of
investor 1 is currently higher (lower) than the relative wealth share that would imply a
representative λ∗t -strategy, it remains higher (lower) in expectation.
Theorem 2.1 Suppose that λ11 6= λ21 and λ11 ≥ λ∗t,1 ≥ λ21 or λ11 ≤ λ∗t,1 ≤ λ21. Then the
following two statements hold:
(A)
Et[r it+1 − r i∗t+1] ≤ |r it − r i∗t | with equality if and only if r it = r i∗t ,
(B) sgn
 
Et[r it+1 − r i∗t+1]

= sgn
 
r it − r i∗t

,
where i = 1,2.
Considering Theorem 2.1 we expect that the relative market capitalizations also move
closer to the ones of the representative-agent model when the two strategies do not
simultaneously invest more (less) than the λ∗t -strategy. In fact, this property holds even
in the case of both strategies investing more (less) than the λ∗t -strategy as stated in
Theorem 2.2.
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Theorem 2.2 The following two statements hold:
(A)
Et[qt+1,k − q∗t+1,k] ≤ qt,k − q∗t,k with equality if and only if qt,k = q∗t,k,
(B) sgn

Et[qt+1,k − q∗t+1,k]

= sgn

qt,k − q∗t,k

,
where k = 1,2.
Theorem 2.2 also says that there is no overshooting of relative market capitalizations in
expectation. Note that Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.2 make statements on conditional
expectations, but not on realized paths. For example overshooting can occasionally
take place as illustrated in the following numerical example.
Example (Sample path): Suppose that the dividends of asset 1 and asset 2 at time
t = 0 are given by (D0,1, D0,2) = (1,1) and that
(Dt+1,1, Dt+1,2) =

(Dt,1 +∆t , Dt,2 −∆t) with probability 0.1,
(Dt,1, Dt,2) with probability 0.8,
(Dt,1 −∆t , Dt,2 +∆t) with probability 0.1,
where t = 1, 2, . . . and ∆t = 0.2 min(Dt,1, Dt,2). Furthermore we assume an investment
rate of 0.6 and investment proportions are given by λ1 = (0.2, 0.8) and λ2 = (0.9, 0.1).
Both investment strategies are initially endowed with the same amount of wealth. The
sample path in Figure 2.1 shows that relative wealth shares tend to move towards the
relative wealth shares that would imply a representative λ∗-strategy and relative prices
tend to move towards the relative prices under the λ∗-strategy. We also see a tendency
not to overshoot, even though an overshooting occurs every now and then.
Note that Theorem 2.2 imposes no restrictions on the rebalancing rules. The claims
on relative prices hold independently of the presence of a dominant investment strategy
as the following two special cases with two identical assets show.28
28See Figure 2.4 in the appendix for a graphical illustration of both cases.
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Figure 2.1: This figure shows a sample path of the relative wealth shares and relative
prices (black lines) as well as the respective relative wealth shares that would imply
relative prices equivalent to the relative prices in a representative-agent model with a
logarithmic utility maximizer (grey lines). The investment rate is 0.6 and the investment
proportions are λ1 = (0.2,0.8) and λ2 = (0.9,0.1). Dividends increase and decrease
by 20% of the smaller current dividend payment with a probability of 0.1, otherwise
they stay the same. The dividend of one asset increases when the dividend of the other
asset decreases and vice versa.
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Example (Dominance): Suppose that there are two identical assets so that relative
dividends remain constant over time. There is one strategy investing proportionally to
relative dividends and another strategy with a different asset allocation. In this case,
the relative-dividend strategy drives the other strategy out of the market over the long
run as shown in Evstigneev et al. (2008).
Example (Co-Survival): Suppose that there are two identical assets so that relative
dividends remain constant over time. There is one strategy investing as much into one
asset as the other strategy invests into the other asset. Due to the symmetry of the
model both strategies must survive in the long run.
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2.3.2 Multiple investment strategies and multiple financial assets
Theorem 2.2 does not generalize to the case of more than two financial assets, though
the market capitalizations of most assets still behave as in the two-asset case. The
following simulations illustrate the extent to which Theorem 2.2 applies for different
numbers of strategies and assets in the market. For each number of strategies and
assets, we randomly generate 100000 realized states from different economies. The
current realization of dividends, wealth and portfolio holdings as well as the investment
rate are drawn from a uniform distribution. Based on these parameters we calculate
the current and expected relative market capitalizations of all assets.
How often did expected relative market capitalizations conditional on the current
state approach the representative-agent benchmark across all simulated economies,
i.e. how often did relation (A) in Theorem 2.2 apply? The upper plot in Figure 2.2
shows the fraction of relative market capitalizations with this property as a function of
the number of assets. Each shade of grey stands for a different number of investment
strategies compared to the number of assets present in the market. The ratio of the
number of strategies to the number of assets from the darkest shade to the lightest is 1,
2, 3, 10, 20, 30. Note that claim (A) always holds in the case of two assets no matter
how many strategies are present in the market. We therefore see only one point on the
vertical line of the two-asset case. In addition, we observe that claim (A) is not true for
a general number of assets. The more assets there are in the market for a fixed number
of strategies to number of assets ratio, the lower the fraction of assets that fulfill claim
(A) is. However, the curves seem to flatten out. Overall the fraction of assets fulfilling
claim (A) is clearly above 70% in all simulated cases. Another interesting observation is
that the more investment strategies there are, the more relative market capitalizations
approach the representative-agent benchmark in expectation.
Let us turn to the second claim in Theorem 2.2. The lower plot in Figure 2.2 shows
the fraction of relative market capitalizations that did not overshoot the representative-
agent benchmark in expectation for different numbers of assets in the economy. The
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Figure 2.2: The upper plot shows the fraction of relative market capitalizations that
are expected to move closer to the representative-agent benchmark in the next period,
i.e. fulfill claim (A) in Theorem 2.2, averaged over 100000 simulated economies. The
lower plot shows the fraction of relative market capitalizations that are expected not to
overshoot the representative-agent benchmark in in the next period, i.e. fulfill claim
(B) in Theorem 2.2, averaged over 10000 simulated economies. The different shades
of grey indicate the ratio of the number of strategies to the number of financial assets.
The ratio from the darkest shade to the lightest shade: 1, 2, 3, 10, 20, 30.
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different shades of grey indicate the same ratios of number of investment strategies to
the number of assets as in the upper plot. Claim (B) also holds in the two-asset case, but
is not true for a general number of assets. After an initial drop, all curves increase in the
number of assets. The fraction of expected overshoots seems to decrease as the number
of assets increases for a larger number of assets. Overall we observe that the fraction of
expected overshoots is negligibly small in all simulated economies and becomes even
smaller as the number of investment strategies increases.
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Figure 2.3: The histograms in the upper row show for which fraction of the 100000
simulated economies (y-axis) which fraction of relative market capitalizations are
expected to move closer to the representative-agent benchmark in the next period
(x-axis), i.e. fulfill claim (A) in Theorem 2.2. The histograms in the row below show for
which fraction of the 100000 simulated economies (y-axis) which fraction of relative
market capitalizations are expected not to overshoot the representative-agent benchmark
in in the next period (x-axis), i.e. fulfill claim (B) in Theorem 2.2. The number of assets
is set to 10. The ratio of the of the number of strategies to the number of assets from
the left to the right: 1, 2, 3, 10, 20, 30.
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The previous results only show averages over all simulated economies. A natural
question to ask is whether there are huge differences across economies with respect to
the fraction of relative market capitalizations that move closer, but do not overshoot the
representative-agent benchmark in expectation. The upper row in Figure 2.3 shows in
how many of the generated economies which fraction of market capitalizations fulfills
claim (A). The number of assets in the market is held constant at 10 for all histograms,
whereas the number of investment strategies varies from the left to the right: 10, 20,
30, 100, 200, 300. We see that there are economies where quite many relative market
capitalizations violate claim (A) when there are as many investment strategies as assets
in the market. As the number of strategies increases relative to the number of assets, the
number of violations decreases and most relative market capitalizations satisfy claim
(A) in pretty much all simulated economies. Simulations with different numbers of
assets can be found in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 in the appendix.
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The lower row in Figure 2.3 shows in how many of the generated economies which
fraction of market capitalizations satisfies claim (B). The number of assets in all
simulations is 10 and the histograms from the left to the right again correspond to a
ratio of the number of strategies to the number of assets of 1, 2, 3, 10, 20, 30. We see
that claim (B) is rarely violated in any of the simulated economies. As the number of
strategies increases relative to the number of assets, the number of economies exhibiting
violations decreases even further.
2.4 Conclusion
The evolutionary approach to finance takes the view that the long-term performance
of investment strategies and asset prices are the outcome of the interaction between
different evolutionary forces. Our analysis identifies a market force that supports the
possible use of a representative agent to study long-term asset prices: The wealth
dynamics tend to push relative asset prices towards relative asset prices that follow
from the decision problem of a commonly used representative agent. In our setting, the
representative agent maximizes a logarithmic utility function and has perfect foresight
even though individual agents follow only simple rebalancing rules.
An interesting extension to our work would be to study the effect of wealth dynamics
in an environment with other evolutionary forces. Brock and Hommes (1998) for
example identify an opposing market force that can lead to barely predictable long-term
asset prices. If individual agents keep changing their investment strategies based on
their past performance, chaotic asset price dynamics can emerge. For a more thorough
assessment of the benefits and limitations of the representative-agent approach, we
need to better understand the extent to which different evolutionary forces are present
in the market and how they interact.
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2.5 Appendix
Existence, uniqueness and positivity of prices:
Suppose that we are at time t. The supply of each financial asset, the consumption
rates, investment proportions, dividends and asset holdings of each investment strategy
are given. Consider the map from RK+ onto itself that maps vector p = (p1, . . . , pK)′ to
vector q = (q1, . . . , qK)′:
qk = V
−1
t,k
I∑
i=1
λit,kα
i
t〈Dt + p, x it−1〉, for k = 1, . . . , K .
Adding to the proof in Amir et al. (2011) the possibility of heterogeneous consumption
rates across investment strategies, we prove that this map is contracting in the normpV = ∑Kk=1 |pk|Vt−1,k. First let us define
α˜ ≡ max
i=1,...,I ,k=1,...,K
αit Vt−1,kV
−1
t,k .
Note that α˜ < 1 because of Assumption 2.1.
q− q˜V = K∑
k=1
|qk − q˜k|Vt−1,k
≤
K∑
k=1
I∑
i=1
λit,kα
i
t Vt−1,kV
−1
t,k |〈p− p˜, x it−1〉|
≤ α˜
K∑
k=1
I∑
i=1
λit,k|〈p− p˜, x it−1〉|
= α˜
I∑
i=1
|〈p− p˜, x it−1〉|
≤ α˜
I∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
|pk − p˜k|x it−1,k
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= α˜
K∑
k=1
|pk − p˜k|
I∑
i=1
x it−1,k
= α˜
K∑
k=1
|pk − p˜k|Vt−1,k
= α˜
p− p˜V
According to the contraction mapping theorem, there exists a unique fixed-point in the
metric space
 
R+,‖·‖

. To show that equilibrium prices are positive, we can start the
iteration from any point p(0) ∈ RK+. The price of the assets k = 1, . . . , K after the first
iteration step are
p(1)k = V
−1
t,k
I∑
i=1
λit,kα
i
t〈Dt + p(0), x it−1〉 ≥ V−1t,k
I∑
i=1
λit,kα
i
t〈Dt , x it−1〉 > 0.
This argument applies to all iteration steps, which implies that prices are positive. 
Derivation of the relative wealth dynamics:
Let us start the derivation from the definition of wealth
w it = 〈Dt + pt , x it−1〉
=
K∑
k=1
 
Dt,k + pt,k

x it−1,k. (2.11)
Note that asset prices and asset holdings as given in equation (2.1) and (2.2) expressed
in terms of relative wealth become
pt,k =
α
Vk
〈λt,k, wt〉
and
x it−1,k =
λit−1,kαw it−1
pt−1,k
=
Vkλ
i
t−1,kw it−1
〈λt−1,k, wt−1〉 .
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Plugging these expressions into the wealth equation (2.11), we obtain
w it =
K∑
k=1

Dt,k +
α
Vk
〈λt,k, wt〉

Vkλ
i
t−1,kw it−1
〈λt−1,k, wt−1〉 . (2.12)
Aggregate wealth therefore is
Wt =
I∑
i=1
w it =
K∑
k=1
 
Dt,kVk +α〈λt,k, wt〉

=
K∑
k=1
Dt,kVk +αWt .
Solving this equation for aggregate wealth, we obtain
Wt =
1
1−α
K∑
k=1
Dt,kVk. (2.13)
Dividing the equation for individual wealth (2.12) by aggregate wealth gives us
r it =
K∑
k=1

Dt,kVk
Wt
+α〈λt,k, rt〉

λit−1,kr it−1
〈λt−1,k, rt−1〉 .
Using the relation between aggregate wealth and aggregate dividends (2.13), we obtain
the relative wealth dynamics
r it =
K∑
k=1
 
(1−α)dt,k +α〈λt,k, rt〉
 λit−1,kr it−1
〈λt−1,k, rt−1〉 .

Proof of Theorem 2.1:
First of all, note the following relation that follows from the first equation in (2.10) and
from the assumption that relative dividends are martingales:Et r1∗t+1
Et

r2∗t+1

 =
λ11 λ21
λ12 λ
2
2
−1Et dt+1,1
Et

dt+1,2

 =
λ11 λ21
λ12 λ
2
2
−1dt,1
dt,2
 =
r1∗t
r2∗t
 .
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Let us start with the proof of (B). Since Et[r i∗t+1] = r i∗t , i = 1, 2, we need to show that
1. r1t < r
1∗
t (r
2
t > r
2∗
t ) =⇒ Et[r1t+1] < r1∗t (Et[r2t+1] > r2∗t ),
2. r1t = r
1∗
t (r
2
t = r
2∗
t ) =⇒ Et[r1t+1] = r1∗t (Et[r2t+1] = r2∗t ),
3. r1t > r
1∗
t (r
2
t < r
2∗
t ) =⇒ Et[r1t+1] > r1∗t (Et[r2t+1] < r2∗t ).
For the proof, let us write Et[r1t+1] as a function of r
1
t . Taking the conditional expectation
of the relative wealth dynamics (2.3) from time t to t + 1, using that r2t = 1− r1t and
Et[r2t+1] = 1− Et[r1t+1] and solving for Et[r1t+1], we obtain
Et[r
1
t+1] = ft(r
1
t ) ≡
a(r1t ) + bt(r
1
t )
a(r1t ) + c(r
1
t )
,
where
a(r1t ) ≡ α
K∑
k=1
λ2k
λ1kr
1
t
〈λk, rt〉 ,
bt(r
1
t ) ≡ (1−α)
K∑
k=1
Et[dt+1,k]
λ1kr
1
t
〈λk, rt〉 ,
c(r1t ) ≡ 1−α
K∑
k=1
λ1k
λ1kr
1
t
〈λk, rt〉 .
It suffices to show that ft(r1∗t ) = r1∗t holds and that the map is strictly monotonically
increasing. By the definition of r1∗t and using that investment proportions sum up to
one, we have
a(r1∗t ) + bt(r
1∗
t ) =

α
K∑
k=1
λ2k
λ1k
〈λk, r∗t 〉 + 1−α

r1∗t ,
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and
a(r1∗t ) + c(r
1∗
t ) = α
K∑
k=1
λ2k
λ1k
〈λk, r∗t 〉 + 1−α
K∑
k=1
λ1k
〈λk, r∗t 〉〈λk, r
∗
t 〉
= α
K∑
k=1
λ2k
λ1k
〈λk, r∗t 〉 + 1−α.
This implies that ft(r1∗t ) = r1∗t holds. The following shows that the expected relative
wealth map is strictly monotonically increasing. Note that
a(r1t ) = α
K∑
k=1
λ2k
λ1kr
1
t
〈λk, rt〉 > 0,
bt(r
1
t ) = (1−α)
K∑
k=1
Et[dt+1,k]
λ1kr
1
t
〈λk, rt〉 > 0,
c(r1t ) = 1−α
K∑
k=1
λ1k
λ1kr
1
t
〈λk, rt〉 > 0.
The derivatives of a(r1t ), bt(r
1
t ) and c(r
1
t ) are
a′(r1t ) = α
∑K
k=1λ
2
k
λ1k
λ1k−λ2k+
λ2k
r1t
2 λ2k(r1t )2 > 0,
b′t(r1t ) = (1−α)
∑K
k=1 Et[dt+1,k]
λ1k
λ1k−λ2k+
λ2k
r1t
2 λ2k(r1t )2 > 0,
c′(r1t ) = −α
∑K
k=1λ
1
k
λ1k
λ1k−λ2k+
λ2k
r1t
2 λ2k(r1t )2 < 0.
The derivative of the relative wealth map is
f ′t (r
1
t ) =
 
a′(r1t ) + b′t(r1t )
  
a(r1t ) + c(r
1
t )
−  a(r1t ) + bt(r1t )  a′(r1t ) + c′(r1t ) 
a(r1t ) + c(r
1
t )
2
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and since a(r1t ), bt(r
1
t ), c(r
1
t ) > 0, a
′(r1t ), b′t(r1t ) > 0 and c′(r1t ) < 0, we have
f ′t (r
1
t ) >
a′(r1t )
 
c(r1t )− bt(r1t )
 
a(r1t ) + c(r
1
t )
2 .
Note that bt(r1t ) is maximal and c(r
1
t ) is minimal for r
1
t = 1. It follows that
f ′t (r
1
t ) >
a′(r1t )
 
c(1)− bt(1)
 
a(r1t ) + c(r
1
t )
2 = 0,
since
c(1)− bt(1) =

1−α
K∑
k=1
λ1k

− (1−α)
K∑
k=1
Et[dt+1,k] = 0.
This concludes the proof of (B). To prove statement (A), we additionally need to show
that
1. r1t < r
1∗
t (r
2
t > r
2∗
t ) =⇒ Et[r1t+1] > r1t (Et[r2t+1] < r2t ),
2. r1t > r
1∗
t (r
2
t < r
2∗
t ) =⇒ Et[r1t+1] < r1t (Et[r2t+1] > r2t ).
Let us start with the claim that r1t < r
1∗
t implies Et[r
1
t+1] > r
1
t . For the proof we show
that f ′t (0) > 1 and that r1∗t is the unique interior fixed point of ft(r1t ). Let us explain
how this proves the claim. Suppose that both statements are true. From the definition
of the derivative we know that for all ε > 0 there is a δ > 0 so that for all r1t with
0 < r1t < δ we have  ft(r1t )− ft(0)r1t − f ′t (0)
 < ε.
Choosing ε < f ′t (0)− 1, we see that there exists a δ > 0 so that for all r1t < δ, we
know that
ft (r1t )− ft (0)
r1t
> 1. Since ft(0) = 0, this is equivalent to r1t < ft(r
1
t ) = Et[r
1
t+1].
Thus, the claim holds true for r1t close enough to zero. Using a continuity argument,
we can show that Et[r1t+1] > r
1
t whenever r
1
t < r
1∗
t . Suppose that the claim was not
true and there was a r1t < r
1∗
t so that Et[r
1
t+1] < r
1
t . Take another relative wealth share
close enough to zero so that Et[r1t+1] > r
1
t . Note that Et[r
1
t+1] = ft(r
1
t ) is a continuous
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function. Because of the intermediate value theorem, the function ft(r1t )− r1t must take
the value zero between these two relative wealth share levels. This would mean that
there exists another point r1t < r
1∗
t for which Et[r
1
t+1] = r
1
t , which is a contradiction to
r1∗t being the unique fixed point.
Now let us show that f ′t (0) > 1. The derivative of ft(r1t ) is
f ′t (r
1
t ) =
 
a′(r1t ) + b′t(r1t )
  
a(r1t ) + c(r
1
t )
−  a(r1t ) + bt(r1t )  a′(r1t ) + c′(r1t ) 
a(r1t ) + c(r
1
t )
2 .
First let us evaluate a(r1t ), bt(r
1
t ) and c(r
1
t ) at the point r
1
t = 0:
a(0) = 0,
bt(0) = 0,
c(0) = 1.
The derivative therefore simplifies to
f ′t (0) = a
′(0) + b′t(0).
The derivatives of a(r1t ) and bt(r
1
t ) are
a′(r1t ) = α
K∑
k=1
λ2k
λ1k
 
λ1kr
1
t +λ
2
k(1− r1t )
−λ1kr1t (λ1k −λ2k) 
λ1kr
1
t +λ
2
k(1− r1t )
2 .
b′t(r
1
t ) = (1−α)
K∑
k=1
Et[dt+1,k]
λ1k
 
λ1kr
1
t +λ
2
k(1− r1t )
−λ1kr1t (λ1k −λ2k) 
λ1kr
1
t +λ
2
k(1− r1t )
2 .
At r1t = 0, we have
a′(0) = α
K∑
k=1
λ1k = α,
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b′t(0) = (1−α)
K∑
k=1
Et[dt+1,k]
λ1k
λ2k
.
Since relative dividends are martingales, we have
f ′t (0) = α+ (1−α)
K∑
k=1
dt,k
λ1k
λ2k
Note that f ′t (0) = 1 if λ2 = λ∗t . However, the case that r1t < r1∗t cannot occur if λ2 = λ∗t
since r1∗t = 0. It remains to show that
∑K
k=1 dt,k
λ1k
λ2k
> 1 for λ2 6= λ∗t and therefore
f ′t (0) > 1. We can write the sum as
K∑
k=1
dt,k
λ1k
λ2k
= dt,1
λ11
λ21
+ (1− dt,1)1−λ
1
1
1−λ21 . (2.14)
The derivative with respect to dt,1 is
λ11
λ21
− 1−λ
1
1
1−λ21 =
λ11 −λ21
λ21(1−λ21) .
Thus, the expression (2.14) is increasing in dt,1 if λ
1
1 > λ
2
1 and decreasing in dt,1 if
λ11 < λ
2
1. Suppose that λ
1
1 ≥ dt,1 > λ21. This means that the expression (2.14) is greater
than evaluated at the point dt,1 = λ21 and this means greater than
λ11 + 1−λ11 = 1.
Suppose that λ11 ≤ dt,1 < λ21. This means that the expression (2.14) is greater than
evaluated at dt,1 = λ21 and therefore greater than
λ11 + 1−λ11 = 1.
We conclude that f ′t (0) > 1.
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Next let us show that r1∗t is the unique interior fixed point of ft(r1t ). The relative
wealth dynamics (2.3) for an interior fixed point are
r1t = Et

K∑
k=1
 
α〈λk, rt+1〉+ (1−α)dt+1,k
 λ1kr1t
〈λk, rt〉

=
K∑
k=1
 
α〈λk, rt〉+ (1−α)Et

dt+1,k
 λ1kr1t
〈λk, rt〉 .
This can be simplified to
1 =
K∑
k=1

αλik + (1−α)Et

dt+1,k
 λik
〈λk, rt〉

= α+ (1−α)
K∑
k=1
Et

dt+1,k
 λik
〈λk, rt〉 ,
or, equivalently,
1 =
K∑
k=1
Et

dt+1,k
 λik
〈λk, rt〉 .
Let us define
ζk ≡ Et[dt+1,k]〈λk, rt〉 .
The ζk, k = 1,2, are uniquely determined by the system of equations1
1
 =
λ11 λ12
λ21 λ
2
2
ζ1
ζ2

Since the investment proportions of each agent sum up to one, the solution is ζ = (1, 1)′.
This implies that
2∑
i=1
λikr
i
t = Et[dt+1,k] = dt,k, (2.15)
but this is the definition of r1∗t and therefore r1∗t is the unique interior fixed point.
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To conclude the proof of (A), we need to show that r1t > r
1∗
t implies Et[r
1
t+1] < r
1
t .
Note that the problem is symmetric to the one above. We can replace strategy one
by strategy two everywhere and show that r2t < r
2∗
t implies Et[r
2
t+1] > r
2
t . Since
(expected) relative wealth shares sum up to one, we obtain our claim. 
Proof of Theorem 2.2:
First note that
Et[q
∗
t+1,k] =
2∑
i=1
λikEt[r
i∗
t+1] =
2∑
i=1
λikr
i∗
t = q
∗
t,k
for k = 1, 2. To prove (A) and (B) we therefore need to show that
1. qt,k < q
∗
t,k =⇒ qt,k < Et[qt+1,k] < q∗t,k,
2. qt,k = q∗t,k =⇒ qt,k = Et[qt+1,k] = q∗t,k,
3. qt,k > q
∗
t,k =⇒ qt,k > Et[qt+1,k] > q∗t,k,
for k=1,2.
Let us consider the case when Theorem 2.1 applies and we have λ11 ≥ λ∗t,1 ≥ λ21 or
λ11 ≤ λ∗t,1 ≤ λ21 and λ11 6= λ21. We write qt,k as a function of r1t :
qt,k = gk(r
1
t ) ≡ λ1kr1t +λ2k(1− r1t ).
This function is strictly monotonically increasing (decreasing) if λ1k > λ
2
k (λ
1
k < λ
2
k). In
the proof of Theorem 2.1, we have shown that
1. r1t < r
1∗
t =⇒ r1t < Et[r1t+1] < r1∗t ,
2. r1t = r
1∗
t =⇒ r1t = Et[r1t+1] = r1∗t ,
3. r1t > r
1∗
t =⇒ r1t > Et[r1t+1] > r1∗t .
Suppose that λ1k > λ
2
k (λ
1
k < λ
2
k). Because of the monotonicity property and noting
that the function gk(·) and expectation are interchangeable, we obtain that r1t < r1∗t
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if and only if qt,k < q
∗
t,k (qt,k > q
∗
t,k) and that r
1
t < Et[r
1
t+1] < r
1∗
t if and only if
qt,k < Et[qt+1,k] < q∗t,k (qt,k > Et[qt+1,k] > q∗t,k). Applying the same argument to
the other two implications, we see that the claim holds in the case of λ11 6= λ21 and
λ11 ≥ λ∗t,1 ≥ λ21 or λ11 ≤ λ∗t,1 ≤ λ21.
Let us turn to the case when both investment strategies invest more into one asset
than the λ∗-strategy and less into the other asset or vice versa. Without loss of generality
we only consider the case λ11 > λ
2
1 > λ
∗
t,1. The other three possible cases directly follow
from this case due to symmetry reasons. Suppose that λ11 > λ
2
1 > λ
∗
t,1 holds. Note that
the price of asset one cannot get below q∗t,1 since
qt,1 =
2∑
i=1
λi1r
i
t > λ
∗
t,1 = q
∗
t,1
and the opposite holds true for asset two. This argument applies at each time step and
for each state, which proves statement (B).
For the proof of statement (A), it remains to show that qt,1 > Et[qt+1,1]. Since the
function g1(r1t ), which maps the relative wealth of strategy one to the relative price of
asset one, is strictly monotonically increasing and interchangeable with the expectation,
it suffices to show that r1t > Et[r
1
t+1]. Recall from the proof of Theorem 2.1 the function
ft(r1t ) that maps the relative wealth share at time t to the expected relative wealth
share at time t +1. To show that r1t > Et[r
1
t+1], we prove that f
′
t (0) < 1 and that there
is no interior fixed point. That there is no interior fixed point follows directly from the
derivation of all interior fixed points for the case that λ11 6= λ21 and λ11 ≥ λ∗t,1 ≥ λ21 or
λ11 ≤ λ∗t,1 ≤ λ21 in the proof of Theorem 2.1. We see that there does not exist a relative
wealth share level so that the condition for an interior fixed point (2.15) is fulfilled if
λ11 > λ
2
1 > λ
∗
t,1.
From the proof of Theorem 2.1 we also know that
f ′t (0) = α+ (1−α)
K∑
k=1
dt,k
λ1k
λ2k
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is increasing for larger values of dt,1. This implies that the derivative f
′
t (0) is bounded
from above by
α+ (1−α)
K∑
k=1
λ2k
λ1k
λ2k
= 1.
The remainder of the proof is analogous to the respective part in the proof of Theorem
2.1. Since f ′t (0) < 1, we know that there exist a relative wealth share level close
enough to zero so that Et[r1t+1] < r
1
t . Suppose that there was a larger relative wealth
share level with Et[r1t+1] > r
1
t . Due to the intermediate value theorem there must be a
point in between so that Et[r1t+1] = r
1
t , which is a contradiction to the non-existence of
an interior fixed point. 
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Figure 2.4: This figure shows relative wealth shares and relative prices (black lines) as
well as the respective relative wealth shares that would imply relative prices equivalent to
the relative prices in a representative-agent model with a logarithmic utility maximizer
(grey lines). The two upper plots illustrate a case where one strategy dominates.
The investment rate is 0.6 and the investment proportions are λ1 = (0.01,0.99) and
λ2 = (0.5,0.5). The two lower plots illustrate a case where both strategies survive.
The investment rate is 0.8 and the investment proportions are λ1 = (0.25,0.75) and
λ2 = (0.75, 0.25). Dividends are the same for both assets and constant over time.
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Figure 2.5: The histograms show for which fraction of the 100000 simulated economies
(y-axis) which fraction of relative market capitalizations are expected to move closer to
the representative-agent benchmark in the next period (x-axis), i.e. fulfill claim (A) in
Theorem 2.2. The number of assets varies from two to ten (top to bottom row) and the
number of investment strategies to assets ratio takes the values 1, 2, 3, 10, 20 and 30
(left to right column).
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Figure 2.6: The histograms show for which fraction of the 100000 simulated economies
(y-axis) which fraction of relative market capitalizations are expected not to overshoot
the representative-agent benchmark in in the next period (x-axis), i.e. fulfill claim (B)
in Theorem 2.2. The number of assets varies from two to ten (top to bottom row) and
the number of investment strategies to assets ratio takes the values 1, 2, 3, 10, 20 and
30 (left to right column).
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3Can the CRRA-Lognormal Framework Explain
CAPM-Anomalies in the Cross-Section of Stock Returns?
For cross-sectional asset pricing, the traditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) is one of the cornerstones of finance.
Even though the CAPM is a very elegant pricing model and widely used in practice,29
its empirical validity is highly debated. A large empirical literature has developed on
asset pricing anomalies with respect to the CAPM. This raises the question whether
the CAPM is based on reasonable assumptions or whether the assumptions needed to
derive the CAPM are too restrictive?30
This chapter discusses CAPM-anomalies in a two-period version of the consumption-
based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM), developed by Rubinstein (1976), Lucas
(1978) and Breeden (1979). The CAPM follows as a special case from the more general
CCAPM if, for example, preferences are quadratic or dividends are normally distributed.
However, Campbell and Viceira (2002) note that preferences must exhibit constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA), because there are no long-term trends in risk premia,
even though per capita consumption and wealth considerably increased in the past.
Dividends are often assumed to follow a lognormal distribution so that they cannot
become negative.
There are plenty of CAPM-anomalies documented in the literature. We restrict our
analysis to three stylized facts. First is the fact that the slope of the empirical security
market line is smaller than the one in the CAPM, i.e. average returns on stocks with a
low beta lie below the security market line of the CAPM whereas average returns on
29See for example the survey by Graham and Harvey (2001).
30For a list of necessary and sufficient conditions to derive the CAPM see Berk (1997).
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stocks with a high beta lie above (see Black et al. (1972) and Frazzini and Pedersen
(2014) for more recent results). Second is the value premium puzzle (see Basu (1977)):
Average returns on stocks with a high fundamental-to-price ratio (value stocks) are
higher than predicted by the CAPM. Third is the size premium puzzle (see Banz (1981)):
Stocks with a small market capitalization yield, on average, positive abnormal returns
with respect to the CAPM.31
The main finding of this chapter is that the CRRA-lognormal framework can at least
qualitatively explain the premium on low-beta stocks, the size premium and the value
premium. This suggests that some important features of preferences and the dividend
distribution to better understand the cross-section of stock returns are not accounted
for by the CAPM. However, we also find that the size of the CAPM-anomalies in the
CRRA-lognormal model is too small and closely linked to the equity premium puzzle.
Our theoretical results therefore support the view that there is a common explanation
for the equity premium puzzle and cross-sectional anomalies.
The cross-sectional properties of the CRRA-lognormal framework have attracted
relatively little attention in the theoretical literature. One reason is that closed-form
solutions for prices and returns in the CRRA-lognormal model with multiple assets
have become available only recently: Cochrane et al. (2008) provide closed-form
solutions in a continuous-time model with logarithmic utility and two risky assets.
Martin (2013) generalizes their results to power utility. The closed-form solutions,
however, are rather intractable for further analytical results on CAPM-anomalies in the
CRRA-lognormal framework. We therefore take a different route and restrict ourselves
to a class of economies within the general CRRA-lognormal framework that yields
tractable closed-form solutions. More precisely, we additionally assume that total
dividends are lognormally distributed across firms.
A closely related strand of literature is the one on higher-order CAPM. The underlying
theory goes back to Kraus and Litzenberger (1983): A monotone increasing strictly
31For more recent results on the size and the value premium see for example Fama and French (2012)
and references therein.
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concave utility with nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, which includes the case of
CRRA utility, implies a preference for positive skewness. The CAPM should therefore
not only price the covariance with market returns, but also the co-skewness. Dittmar
(2002) argues that positive and decreasing marginal utility with decreasing absolute
risk aversion and decreasing absolute prudence, which includes the case of CRRA utility,
implies not only preference for skewness, but also kurtosis aversion. The CAPM should
therefore price the co-kurtosis as well. On one hand, his empirical analysis shows that
skewness and kurtosis capture the size and the value premium. On the other hand, the
model with CRRA preferences is rejected.
Our study provides theoretical support for a connection between the preference for
higher-order moments and CAPM-anomalies. Note that the lognormal distribution is
positively skewed and has a positive kurtosis. The preference for skewness and kurtosis
aversion should therefore partly offset each other. Our results can be understood as the
net pricing impact of all higher-order moments.
Other related studies comparing the CRRA-lognormal model to the CAPM find that
the CAPM holds approximately in the CRRA-lognormal framework. In their book,
Campbell and Viceira (2002) argue that in discrete time an approximate CAPM holds
when time intervals are short. Herings and Kübler (2007) demonstrate computationally
that the CAPM holds approximately. This is in line with our quantitative results.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.1, we define the model and report
closed-form solutions for price-dividend ratios, expected returns, CAPM betas and
CAPM pricing errors in the CRRA-lognormal framework. Section 3.2 discusses the
relation between the CAPM pricing error and different CAPM-anomalies. There we
show that the CRRA-lognormal framework can qualitatively explain CAPM-anomalies
in the cross-section of stock returns. Section 3.3 discusses the size of the generated
CAPM-anomalies with respect to different parameter values.
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3.1 The Two-Period Economy
In this chapter we analyze a two-period economy. We keep the model as simple as
possible in order to get tractable closed-form solutions. Two is the minimum number
of periods required to discuss the relation between expected returns and beginning-of-
period prices and price-dividend ratios.
The economy consists of a continuum of firms.32 Firms are characterized by their
dividend payments and accordingly indexed by ρ ∈ R. A firm of type ρ pays a total
dividend of Dρt at time t = 0,1. We impose the common assumption that the total
dividend of each firm is lognormally distributed. In addition, we assume a lognormal
distribution of dividends across firms as specified in Assumption 3.1.33
Assumption 3.1 Total dividends are lognormally distributed across time and across firms.
More precisely, a firm of type ρ pays a total dividend
Dρt = e
ρ yt for t = 0, 1,
where y0 is a constant, y1 ∼ N (µ,σ2) and ρ ∼ N (µρ,σ2ρ).
Note that Assumption 3.1 incorporates a common source of risk across assets, but no
idiosyncratic risk component. The effect of idiosyncratic risk on our results is discussed
in Section 3.2.3.
There is a representative agent who initially owns all firms in the economy. Since
there is a continuum of firms, the number of type-ρ firms is described by a density
function f (ρ).34 The value of a type-ρ firm is denoted by qρ. The agent chooses
32This assumption simplifies notation, but is not necessary. The number of firms can be discretized.
33Elmiger (2010) documents that the cross-section of total dividends follows approximately a lognormal
distribution except for the tails of the distribution.
34The total number of firms is normalized to one.
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portfolio holdings θρ to maximize the expected utility derived from consumption ct at
time t = 0,1. The objective function is
u(c0) +δE

u(c1)

subject to the budget constraints
c0 +
∫ ∞
−∞
qρθρdρ =
∫ ∞
−∞
(qρ + Dρ0 ) f (ρ)dρ
c1 =
∫ ∞
−∞
Dρ1 θ
ρdρ,
The representative agent has CRRA preferences u(c) = (c)1−γ/(1− γ), where γ > 0
denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Future expected utility is discounted with
the factor 0 < δ < 1. In equilibrium the agent owns all firms entirely and consumption
equals aggregate dividends: ct = DMt at time t = 0,1. Aggregate dividends at time
t = 0,1 are given by
DMt =
∫ ∞
−∞
Dρt f (ρ)dρ =
∫ ∞
−∞
eρ yt f (ρ)dρ = eµρ yt+
1
2
σ2ρ y
2
t ,
where f (ρ) denotes the density function of the normal distribution N (µρ,σ2ρ). We see
that aggregate dividends are, in general, not lognormally distributed. They are only
approximately lognormal if the cross-sectional dispersion of dividends, σ2
ρ
, is very small.
Throughout the paper, we assume without loss of generality that µρ = 1.35
3.1.1 Asset prices and returns
In this section, we report closed-form solutions for price-dividend ratios and expected
returns. The derivations of the closed-form solutions are in the appendix.
35Results for µρ 6= 1 can be obtained by scaling µ, σ and σρ accordingly.
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Proposition 3.1 The price-dividend ratio of a firm of type ρ is
qρ
Dρ0
=
δÆ
1+ γσ2
ρ
σ2
e
1
2σ2
((ρ−γ−γσ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1+γσ2ρσ
2 − 12σ2 (µ−y0)2.
Note that the price-dividend ratio depends not only on average expected logarithmic
dividend growth µ− y0, but also on the current average level of logarithmic dividends.
Corollary 3.1 In the case of a single firm the formula for the price-dividend ratio reduces
to
q
D0
= δe(1−γ)(µ−y0)+ 12 (1−γ)2σ2.
Corollary 3.1 directly follows from Proposition 3.1 by setting ρ = 1 and σρ = 0.
Next, we compute expected returns. The return on assets of a type-ρ firm in our
two-period model is given by
Dρ1
qρ
36 and the return on the market portfolio is given by
DM1
qM
.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that σ2
ρ
σ2 < 1. Then the expected return on an asset of type ρ,
the expected return on the market portfolio and the riskless rate are
E [Rρ] =
Æ
1+ γσ2
ρ
σ2
δ
e
ρ(µ−y0)+ 12ρ2σ2− 12σ2
((ρ−γ−γσ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1+γσ2ρσ
2 +
1
2σ2
(µ−y0)2
,
E

RM

=
Æ
1− (1− γ)σ2
ρ
σ2
δ
Æ
1−σ2
ρ
σ2
e
1
2σ2
((1+σ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1−σ2ρσ2
− 1
2σ2
((1−γ)(1+σ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1−(1−γ)σ2ρσ2 ,
R f =
Æ
1+ γσ2
ρ
σ2
δ
e
− 1
2σ2
(−γ(1+σ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1+γσ2ρσ
2 +
1
2σ2
(µ−y0)2
.
The assumption σ2
ρ
σ2 < 1 is used in the proof and guarantees that the formulas
given above are well-defined. We will see later that this condition includes sets of
reasonable parameter values.
36The return equals total future dividends divided by the current market capitalization since the asset
supply is constant over time in our model.
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Corollary 3.2 In the case of a single firm the formula for the expected return on the risky
asset and the formula for the riskless asset reduce to
E [R] =
1
δ
eγ(µ−y0)+(γ− 12γ2)σ2,
R f =
1
δ
eγ(µ−y0)− 12γ2σ2.
Corollary 3.2 directly follows from Proposition 3.2 by setting ρ = 1 and σρ = 0.
3.1.2 CAPM beta and CAPM pricing error
In the CRRA-lognormal framework under study, the CAPM does not hold. Expected
excess returns therefore must equal expected excess returns as predicted by the CAPM
plus some error term. Consistent with the notation of the empirical literature on the
CAPM we call this systematic deviation from the CAPM alpha. This section provides
closed-form solutions for the CAPM beta and the CAPM alpha. A detailed analysis of the
qualitative and quantitative properties of the CAPM pricing error follows in Section 3.2
and Section 3.3. Section 3.2 shows that the CAPM pricing error can at least qualitatively
explain CAPM-anomalies in the cross-section of stock returns, whereas Section 3.3
discusses the comparative statics.
The CAPM states that the expected excess return on an asset of type ρ is
E [Rρ]− R f = βρ  ERM− R f  , where βρ = Cov(Rρ, RM)
Var(RM)
.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose that σ2
ρ
σ2 < 1
2
. Then the CAPM beta of an asset of type ρ is
βρ =
g(1− γ, 0)g(1,ρσ2)g(0, 0)− g(1, 0)g(0,ρσ2)
g(−γ,ρσ2)g(2, 0)g(0, 0)− g(1,0)2 ,
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where
g(a, b) ≡ e
1
2σ2
(a(1+σ2ρ y0)σ2+b+(µ−y0))2
1−aσ2ρσ2Æ
1− aσ2
ρ
σ2
.
The condition σ2
ρ
σ2 < 1
2
is more restrictive than the condition in Proposition 3.2.
However, we will show that it still contains sets of reasonable parameter values. This
condition is introduced for the proof of Proposition 3.3 and guarantees that the above
formula is well-defined.
In the CCAPM with CRRA preferences we have
E [Rρ]− R f = βρcon
 
E

RM
− R f  , where βρcon = Cov  Rρ, (RM)−γCov  RM , (RM)−γ .
Thus, the CAPM pricing error in the CRRA-lognormal framework is given by
αρ =
 
βρcon − βρ
  
E[RM]− R f  .
Proposition 3.4 The CAPM pricing error of an asset of type ρ is
αρ =
 
βρcon − βρ
  
E[RM]− R f  ,
where β , E[RM], R f are given in Proposition 3.2 and 3.3, and
βρcon =
h
 
(1− γ)η, 1− γh ρ − γη,−γh(0,0)− h −γη,−γh ρ, 0
h
 
ρ − γη,−γh (1− γ)η, 1− γh(0, 0)− h η, 1h −γη,−γ ,
where
h(a, b) ≡ e
1
2σ2
(aσ2+(µ−y0))2
1−bσ2ρσ2Æ
1− bσ2
ρ
σ2
,
η ≡ 1+σ2
ρ
y0.
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3.2 CAPM Anomalies
The empirical literature documents plenty of CAPM-anomalies, some of them are related
to each other in one way or another. We restrict ourselves to three anomalies that have
a long history in the literature: the low-beta premium, the size premium and the value
premium.
3.2.1 Low-beta premium
Early empirical studies on the validity of the CAPM like Black et al. (1972) or the more
recent study by Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) suggest that the security market line in
the CAPM is too steep: They find that portfolios with a low beta lie above the security
market line, whereas portfolios with a high beta lie below the security market line. Is
the CRRA-lognormal model consistent with this stylized fact? We find that the security
market line can indeed be steeper in the CRRA-lognormal model than in the CAPM for
a very large set of assets.
Let us start with a numerical example to illustrate our point. We set the coefficient
of relative risk aversion to one and assume a discount factor of 0.96. The dividend
parameters are chosen in a way that the resulting cross-section of total dividends and
aggregate dividend growth take reasonable values: y0 = 16.70, µ = 16.72, σ = 0.2,
σρ = 0.076.37 The implied expected logarithmic aggregate dividend growth is 2.2%
and the standard deviation is 20.1%. The mean dividend payment across assets is $40
million and the standard deviation is $80 million. In this numerical example, assets
with a small beta yield a positive alpha, whereas assets with a high beta yield a negative
alpha (see Figure 3.1). The figure also shows that the CAPM pricing error, αρ, is not a
monotone function of βρ. There are pairs of assets, where the asset with a higher beta
yields a higher alpha. The security market line in the CRRA-lognormal model therefore
looks more like a curve rather than a straight line. Is this contradictory to the observed
37Reasonable means that aggregate dividend growth and the size of dividend payments across assets
lie in the range reported by Chen (2009) and DeAngelo et al. (2004).
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Figure 3.1: The left plot shows the security market line of the CAPM (black solid line)
and of the CCAPM (grey dashed line), whereas the right plot shows the difference
between the two security market lines. The parameters are δ = 0.96, γ = 1, y0 = 16.7,
µ = 16.72, σ = 0.2, σρ = 0.076. They generate expected logarithmic aggregate
dividend growth of 2.2% and standard deviation of 20.1%. The implied cross-section
of dividends has a mean of $40 million and a standard deviation of $80 million.
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almost straight line observed in empirical studies? Note that σρ in our example is quite
small. In fact, around 99% of all assets have a beta between 0.7 and 1.1. The security
market line of the CRRA-lognormal model is flatter than the security market line of the
CAPM everywhere in this range.
In a next step, we will analyze analytically to what extent the above result depends
on the chosen parameter values. Can we always find a decreasing relation between αρ
and βρ over a large range of assets? First, let us note that there is not a one-to-one
relation between αρ and βρ as the previous example shows. Therefore αρ cannot
decrease with respect to βρ everywhere. Can we at least find a decreasing relation over
the βρ-values that occur most often across assets? To address this question, we first
discuss the properties of αρ and βρ as functions of ρ.
The function βρ has either one extremum or three extrema depending on the
parameter values (see Lemma 3.1). The largest extremum is in either case a minimum,
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which means that βρ is an increasing function for larger values of ρ. This will be
important when we answer the question whether αρ tends to decrease with βρ.
Lemma 3.1 One of the following holds:
• If (γ+ 1)e
− (µσ2ρ+1)2
2(1−σ2σ2ρ )σ2ρ ≥ γ(1−σ2σ2
ρ
) holds, then βρ has one local minimum:
ρmin
β
= − (µσ2ρ+1)
σ2σ2ρ
.
• If (γ+ 1)e
− (µσ2ρ+1)2
2(1−σ2σ2ρ )σ2ρ < γ(1−σ2σ2
ρ
) holds, then βρ has one local maximum and
two local minima:
ρmax
β
= − (µσ2ρ+1)
σ2σ2ρ
,
ρmin,1
β
=
È
2(σ2σ2ρ−1) ln

− (γ+1)
γ(σ2σ2ρ−1)

σ2ρ+(µσ
2
ρ+1)
2−µσ2ρ−1
σ2σ2ρ
,
ρmin,2
β
=
−
È
2(σ2σ2ρ−1) ln

− (γ+1)
γ(σ2σ2ρ−1)

σ2ρ+(µσ
2
ρ+1)
2−µσ2ρ−1
σ2σ2ρ
.
Lemma 3.1 is straightforward, but lengthy to prove. We use a symbolic calculator
to compute the zeros of the first derivative and to determine the signs of the second
derivative.38
Recall that the CAPM pricing error is given by αρ = (βρcon − βρ)
 
E[RM]− R f  .
Since the expected market excess return does not depend on ρ, we focus our analysis
on (βρcon − βρ). The function (βρcon − βρ) has either one extremum or three extrema
depending on the choice of parameters (see Lemma 3.2). Note that the largest extremum
is in either case a maximum. (βρcon − βρ) therefore is a decreasing function for values
larger than the respective maximum.
38Intermediate results are available on request.
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Lemma 3.2 Define
C ≡Æγσ2σ2
ρ
+ 1
Æ
1−σ2σ2
ρ
e
(µσ2ρ+1)
2
2((γ−1)σ2σ2ρ+1)σ2ρ
+
γ(µσ2ρ+1)
2
2(γσ2σ2ρ+1)σ
2
ρ
+
(µσ2ρ+1)
2
2(σ2σ2ρ−1)σ2ρ
−Æ(γ− 1)σ2σ2
ρ
+ 1e
γ(µσ2ρ+1)
2
2((γ−1)σ2σ2ρ+1)σ2ρ ,
D ≡Æ(γ− 1)σ2σ2
ρ
+ 1(σ2σ2
ρ
− 1)2e
γ(µσ2ρ+1)
2
2((γ−1)σ2σ2ρ+1)σ2ρ
+
(µσ2ρ+1)
2
2(σ2σ2ρ−1)σ2ρ
−Æγσ2σ2
ρ
+ 1

1−σ2σ2
ρ
 3
2
Æ
1− 2σ2σ2
ρ
e
(µσ2ρ+1)
2
2((γ−1)σ2σ2ρ+1)σ2ρ
+
γ(µσ2ρ+1)
2
2(γσ2σ2ρ+1)σ
2
ρ
+
(µσ2ρ+1)
2
(2σ2σ2ρ−1)σ2ρ .
Then one of the following holds:
• If (γ+ 1)
Æ
1− 2σ2σ2
ρ
Ce
− (µσ2ρ+1)2
(1−σ2σ2ρ )σ2ρ + γD ≤ 0 holds, then (βρcon − βρ) has one local
maximum:
ρmax(βcon−β) = −
(µσ2ρ+1)
σ2σ2ρ
.
• If (γ+ 1)
Æ
1− 2σ2σ2
ρ
Ce
− (µσ2ρ+1)2
(1−σ2σ2ρ )σ2ρ + γD > 0 holds, then (βρcon − βρ) has one local
minimum and two local maxima:
ρmin(βcon−β) = −
(µσ2ρ+1)
σ2σ2ρ
,
ρmax ,1(βcon−β) =
√√√√2(σ2σ2ρ−1)
 
(2σ2σ2ρ−1) ln
 
− (γ+1)
p
1−2σ2σ2ρC
γD
!
σ2ρ+(µσ
2
ρ+1)
2
!
−(µσ2ρ+1)
Æ
2σ2σ2ρ−1
σ2σ2ρ
Æ
2σ2σ2ρ−1
,
ρmax ,2(βcon−β) =
−
√√√√2(σ2σ2ρ−1)
 
(2σ2σ2ρ−1) ln
 
− (γ+1)
p
1−2σ2σ2ρC
γD
!
σ2ρ+(µσ
2
ρ+1)
2
!
−(µσ2ρ+1)
Æ
2σ2σ2ρ−1
σ2σ2ρ
Æ
2σ2σ2ρ−1
.
Suppose that the expected market risk premium is positive and αρ exhibits the same
properties as (βρcon − βρ). Combining the findings in Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2, we
conclude that αρ is decreasing in βρ for values of ρ larger than the largest extremum
of both αρ and βρ. We can therefore determine a number of assets for which the CAPM
pricing error is a decreasing function of the CAPM beta (see Proposition 3.5).
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Proposition 3.5 Suppose that the expected market risk premium is positive. αρ then
is decreasing in βρ for at least a fraction

1−Φ

ρ∗SM L−µρ
σρ

of the firms, where ρ∗SM L
denotes the largest extremum of (βρcon − βρ) and βρ and Φ(·) denotes the complementary
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
Note that the fraction of firms

1−Φ

ρ∗SM L−1
σρ

corresponds to the number of
firms, since we normalized the total number of firms to one. Proposition 3.5 follows
immediately from Lemma 3.1 and 3.2 and from the assumption that ρ is normally
distributed with mean µρ and standard deviation σρ. Table 3.1 shows that the lower
bound to the range of firms where the security market line in the CCAPM is flatter than
the security market line of the CAPM is quite large for different parameter values.
3.2.2 Size and value premium
The size and the value premium go back to the empirical studies of Banz (1981) and
Basu (1977). Banz (1981) shows that stocks with small market capitalizations have
higher average returns after adjustment for market risk than stocks with large market
capitalizations. In other words, small stocks have a higher alpha than large stocks.
Basu (1977) finds that stocks with low price-earnings ratios (value stocks) have higher
average returns after adjustment for market risk than stocks with high price-earnings
ratios (growth stocks). Thus, value stocks have a higher alpha than growth stocks.
Empirical studies on other price-to-fundamental and fundamental-to-price ratios yield
similar results (see the survey by Fama and French (2004) and references therein). Our
analysis will focus on the dividend yield.
Let us first illustrate the size and the value premium using the numerical example
from the previous section. Figure 3.2 shows the CAPM pricing error in relation to the
market capitalization and dividend yield for 99% of all firms. We see that there is
a decreasing relation between the CAPM pricing error and the market capitalization,
whereas the CAPM pricing error increases with the dividend yield.
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Table 3.1: This table shows the standard normal cumulative distribution function for
different parameter values. The complementary cumulative distribution function is a
lower bound to the fraction of firms, where the security market line in the CCAPM is
flatter than the security market line in the CAPM.
δ γ µ σ y0 σρ E
[
ln
(
DM1
DM0
)]
σ
(
ln
(
DM1
DM0
))
Dρ0 |Dρ0 −Dρ0 | ρ∗SML Φ
(
ρ∗SML−1
σρ
)
0.96 1 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.076 2.2% 20.1 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.5577 3.0e-9
0.96 1 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.1 2.4% 20.3 % $70 mn $300 mn 0.5963 2.7e-5
0.96 1 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.12 2.5% 20.6 % $100 mn $1 bn 0.6364 0.0012
0.96 1 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.14 2.7% 21.1 % $300 mn $4 bn 0.6839 0.0120
0.96 1 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.16 2.9% 21.8 % $600 mn $23 bn 0.7389 0.0513
0.96 1 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.18 3.2% 22.8 % $2 bn $200 bn 0.8015 0.1351
0.96 1 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.2 3.4% 24.1 % $5 bn $1 tn 0.8721 0.2612
0.96 1 16.72 0.4 16.7 0.076 2.2% 40.2 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.5782 1.4e-8
0.96 1 16.72 0.6 16.7 0.076 2.3% 60.3 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.6121 1.7e-7
0.96 1 16.72 0.8 16.7 0.076 2.4% 80.4 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.6584 3.4e-6
0.96 1 16.8 0.2 16.7 0.076 11.0% 20.1 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.5580 3.0e-9
0.96 1 17 0.2 16.7 0.076 32.9% 20.1 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.5586 3.2e-9
0.96 3 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.076 2.2% 20.1 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.5665 5.9e-9
0.96 5 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.076 2.2% 20.1 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.5753 1.1e-8
0.96 1 16.71 0.1 16.7 0.076 1.1% 10.1 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.5526 2.0e-9
0.96 1 16.71 0.2 16.7 0.076 1.1% 20.1 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.5577 2.9e-9
1
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Figure 3.2: The left plot illustrates the small size premium and shows the CAPM pricing
error as a function of market capitalization. The right plot illustrates the value premium
and shows the CAPM pricing error as a function of the dividend yield. The parameters
are δ = 0.96, γ = 1, y0 = 16.7, µ = 16.72, σ = 0.2, σρ = 0.076. They generate
expected logarithmic aggregate dividend growth of 2.2% and standard deviation of
20.1%. The implied cross-section of dividends has a mean of $40 million and a standard
deviation of $80 million.
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The question is whether the size and the value premium generally arise in this model
or depend on our choice of parameters? Since one can show that there is no one-to-one
relationship between the CAPM pricing error and the market capitalization or dividend
yield, we first analyze the market capitalization and dividend yield as functions of ρ.
We then combine the results with Lemma 3.2 to understand the relation between the
CAPM pricing error and the market capitalization or dividend yield.
Lemma 3.3 Market capitalization qρ has one local minimum:
ρminq =
γσ2−µ
σ2
.
Market capitalization qρ as a function of ρ has one local minimum and the largest
extremum of (βρcon − βρ) is a maximum (see Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.2). This implies
that there exists a threshold ρ∗q, above which market capitalization is increasing and the
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difference in betas (βρcon − βρ) is decreasing. In this range of ρ-values, (βρcon − βρ) is
decreasing in qρ. If the expected market risk premium is positive, the CAPM pricing error
αρ =
 
βρcon − βρ
  
E[RM]− R f  is decreasing with an increasing market capitalization
qρ. Thus, we can determine the number of assets for which the CAPM pricing error is a
decreasing function of the market capitalization (see Proposition 3.6). Note that we do
not include a table with values of

1−Φ

ρ∗q−µρ
σρ

for different parameter specifications,
since the values happen to coincide with the ones in Table 3.1: ρ∗q = ρ∗SM L.
Proposition 3.6 Suppose that the expected market risk premium is positive. The CAPM
pricing error αρ then is decreasing in the market capitalization qρ for at least a fraction
1−Φ

ρ∗q−µρ
σρ

of all firms, where ρ∗q denotes the largest extremum of (βρcon − βρ) and
qρ and Φ(·) denotes the complementary cumulative distribution function of the standard
normal distribution.
In order to analyze the value premium, we proceed analogously to the analysis of
the low-beta premium and size premium. The dividend yield as a function of ρ has
one local maximum (see Lemma 3.4). This means that there is a threshold value above
which the dividend yield decreases with increasing values of ρ.
Lemma 3.4 The dividend yield Dρ0 /q
ρ has one local maximum:
ρmaxD/q =
γσ2(σ2ρ y0+1)+y0−µ
σ2
.
The fact that the dividend yield Dρ0 /q
ρ as well as the difference in betas (βρcon − βρ)
decrease above a certain threshold (see Lemma 3.2 and 3.4) implies that (βρcon − βρ)
increases with increasing values of Dρ0 /q
ρ. Therefore if the expected market risk
premium is positive, the CAPM pricing error αρ =
 
βρcon − βρ
  
E[RM]− R f  increases
with the dividend yield. We can therefore determine the number of assets for which the
CAPM pricing error is an increasing function of the dividend yield (see Proposition 3.7).
Proposition 3.7 Suppose that the expected market risk premium is positive. The CAPM
pricing error αρ then is increasing in the dividend yield Dρ0 /q
ρ for at least a fraction
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
1−Φ

ρ∗D/q−µρ
σρ

of all firms, where ρ∗D/q denotes the largest extremum of (βρcon − βρ)
and Dρ0 /q
ρ and Φ(·) denotes the complementary cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution.
Table 3.2 shows the lower bound to the fraction of firms, where firms with a high
dividend-price ratio pay a higher return adjusted for market risk than firms with a low
dividend-price ratio. We see that the choice of parameters has a larger influence on the
range of firms, where value firms pay a premium. For some parameter values, less than
half the firms belong to this range.
3.2.3 Impact of idiosyncratic risk
This section discusses how firm-specific risk affects part of our results. For notational
convenience we extend the model to firm-type-specific sources of risk instead of firm-
specific sources of risk. However, all arguments carry over to the case of firm-specific
risk. While all our results on low-beta stocks remain the same, idiosyncratic risk affects
price-related variables and therefore our results on the size and the value premium.
In this section dividends are given by
Dρ1 = e
ρ y1+ερ ,
where ερ denotes a firm-type-specific source of risk. Market capitalizations are
qρ = E

δ

c0
c1
γ
Dρ1

= E

δ

c0
c1
γ
eρ y1+ερ

= E

δ

c0
c1
γ
eρ y1

E [eερ] .
We see that market capitalizations depend on the expectation of the idiosyncratic risk
factor. On the other hand, idiosyncratic risk has no impact on the CAPM beta and the
pricing error. The CAPM beta in the model with idiosyncratic risk is given by
βρ =
Cov
 
Rρ, RM

Var
 
RM
 = Cov

eρ y1+ερ
qρ
, RM

Var
 
RM
 = Cov  eρ y1, RM E[eερ ]qρ
Var
 
RM
 .
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Table 3.2: This table shows the standard normal cumulative distribution function for
different parameter values. The complementary cumulative distribution function is a
lower bound to the fraction of firms, where firms with a higher dividend-price ratio pay
higher returns adjusted for market risk than firms with a lower dividend-price ratio.
δ γ µ σ y0 σρ E
[
ln
(
DM1
DM0
)]
σ
(
ln
(
DM1
DM0
))
Dρ0 |Dρ0 −Dρ0 | ρ∗D/q Φ
(
ρ∗D/q−1
σρ
)
0.96 1 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.076 2.2% 20.1 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.5965 5.5e-8
0.96 1 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.1 2.4% 20.3 % $70 mn $300 mn 0.6670 4.4e-4
0.96 1 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.12 2.5% 20.6 % $100 mn $1 bn 0.7405 0.0053
0.96 1 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.14 2.7% 21.1 % $300 mn $4 bn 0.8273 0.1087
0.96 1 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.16 2.9% 21.8 % $600 mn $23 bn 0.9275 0.3253
0.96 1 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.18 3.2% 22.8 % $2 bn $200 bn 1.0411 0.5903
0.96 1 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.2 3.4% 24.1 % $5 bn $1 tn 1.1680 0.7995
0.96 1 16.72 0.4 16.7 0.076 2.2% 40.2 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.9715 0.3538
0.96 1 16.72 0.6 16.7 0.076 2.3% 60.3 % $40 mn $80 mn 1.0409 0.7048
0.96 1 16.72 0.8 16.7 0.076 2.4% 80.4 % $40 mn $80 mn 1.0652 0.8045
0.96 1 16.8 0.2 16.7 0.076 11.0% 20.1 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.5580 3.0e-9
0.96 1 17 0.2 16.7 0.076 32.9% 20.1 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.5586 3.2e-9
0.96 3 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.076 2.2% 20.1 % $40 mn $80 mn 2.7894 1
0.96 5 16.72 0.2 16.7 0.076 2.2% 20.1 % $40 mn $80 mn 4.9823 1
0.96 1 16.71 0.1 16.7 0.076 1.1% 10.1 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.5526 2.0e-9
0.96 1 16.71 0.2 16.7 0.076 1.1% 20.1 % $40 mn $80 mn 0.8465 0.0217
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Inserting the above expression for market capitalizations, we obtain
βρ =
Cov
 
eρ y1, RM

E
h
δ

c0
c1
γ
eρ y1
i−1
Var
 
RM
 .
Hence βρ does not depend on the idiosyncratic risk component ερ. For computing the
CAPM pricing error, we proceed analogously. Recall that the pricing error is given by
αρ =

Cov
 
(RM)−γ, Rρ

Cov
 
(RM)−γ, RM
 − Cov(Rρ, RM)
Var(RM)
 
E[RM]− R f  .
The only two terms that could possibly depend on idiosyncratic risk are Cov
 
(RM)−γ, Rρ

and Cov(Rρ, RM). The second term does not depend on idiosyncratic risk as shown
above and
Cov
 
(RM)−γ, Rρ

= Cov

(RM)−γ,
eρ y1+ερ
qρ

= Cov
 
(RM)−γ, eρ y1
 E[eερ]
qρ
.
Inserting the above expression for market capitalizations, we have
Cov
 
(RM)−γ, Rρ

= Cov
 
(RM)−γ, eρ y1

E

δ

c0
c1
γ
eρ y1
−1
.
Idiosyncratic risk therefore affects neither the CAPM pricing error nor the CAPM beta.
Since the CAPM beta as well as the pricing error do not depend on idiosyncratic risk,
we conclude that our previous results in a model without idiosyncratic risk still hold in
the presence of idiosyncratic risk.
Apparently idiosyncratic risk has an impact on market capitalizations, but not on
the CAPM pricing error. Therefore we cannot say anything about the relation between
αρ and qρ or Dρ0 /q
ρ respectively without knowing the distribution of idiosyncratic risk
across firms. Since we are not aware of any empirical results on the distribution of
idiosyncratic risk across firms, we do not attempt to model it.
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3.3 Comparative Statics
The CRRA-lognormal framework can at least qualitatively explain different CAPM-
anomalies in the cross-section of stock-returns over a large range of firms. The previous
results focused mostly on how large this range of firms is depending on different
parameter values. We did not discuss the size of the CAPM pricing error. The following
analysis shows that the CAPM pricing error is far too small with an order of thousandths
for reasonable parameter values. In a sense we should expect it to be too small:
the CAPM pricing error αρ =
 
βρcon − βρ
  
E[RM]− R f  is proportional to the equity
premium, which is generally known to be too small in the CRRA-lognormal framework.
In the following, we discuss graphically how the CAPM pricing error relates to different
parameter specifications.39
Figure 3.3: The left plot shows the CAPM pricing error as a function of the CAPM beta
for different values of y0, whereas the right plot shows the CAPM pricing error as a
function of the CAPM beta for different values of µ. The parameters are δ = 0.96,
γ = 1, y0 = 16.7, µ = 16.72, σ = 0.2, σρ = 0.076 unless specified differently in the
legend of the plot.
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39The memory of our symbolic calculator does not suffice for an analytical discussion.
62
3.3.1 Dividend distribution parameters
The two parameters y0 and µ determine expected logarithmic dividend growth:
E

ln(Dρ1 /D
ρ
0 )

= ρ(µ− y0).
The CAPM pricing error increases with increasing expected logarithmic dividend growth
(see Figure 3.3). This follows from the observation that the CAPM pricing error increases
with µ and decreases with y0.
The parameterσ determines the volatility of logarithmic dividend growth ln(Dρ1 /D
ρ
0 )
which equals ρσ. The CAPM pricing error increases with increasing values of σ (see
Figure 3.4). This brings out the relation between the cross-sectional anomalies and
the equity premium puzzle even more. The CRRA-lognormal framework struggles to
explain the magnitude of cross-sectional anomalies as well as the high equity premium
partly due to the low volatility of consumption growth, which equals aggregate dividend
growth in our model.
The cross-sectional parameter σρ controls for the average deviation of logarithmic
dividend payments ln(Dρt ) from the mean at time t = 0, 1 which equals σρ yt . A rise in
σρ increases the magnitude of cross-sectional anomalies (see Figure 3.4).
3.3.2 Preference parameters
The impact of the time discount factor δ on the pricing error is easily determined. Note
that the discount factor affects neither the CAPM beta nor the CCAPM beta. It only
changes the endogenously determined equity premium. An increase in the discount
factor decreases the equity premium and thus the CAPM pricing error (see Figure 3.5).
The coefficient of relative risk aversion γ increases the magnitude of cross-sectional
anomalies (see Figure 3.5). This again highlights the connection between the equity
premium puzzle and the cross-sectional puzzles. Both are low partly due to the low
coefficient of relative risk aversion that investors have.
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Figure 3.4: The left plot shows the CAPM pricing error as a function of the CAPM beta
for different values of σ, whereas the right plot shows the CAPM pricing error as a
function of the CAPM beta for different values of σρ. The parameters are δ = 0.96,
γ = 1, y0 = 16.7, µ = 16.72, σ = 0.2, σρ = 0.076 unless specified differently in the
legend of the plot.
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Figure 3.5: The left plot shows the CAPM pricing error as a function of the CAPM
beta for different values of γ, whereas the right plot shows the CAPM pricing error as
a function of the CAPM beta for different values of δ.The parameters are δ = 0.96,
γ = 1, y0 = 16.7, µ = 16.72, σ = 0.2, σρ = 0.076 unless specified differently in the
legend of the plot.
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3.4 Conclusion
The presented example economy shows that the CCAPM with CRRA preferences and
lognormal returns can qualitatively explain CAPM-anomalies in the cross-section of
stock returns. The model implies a security market line that is flatter than the one in the
CAPM over the range of most assets. Most low-beta assets therefore pay higher returns
adjusted for market risk as measured by the CAPM than high-beta assets. Furthermore,
the smaller slope of the security market line leads to a size premium and a value
premium.
Another interesting finding is that the CAPM pricing error might not capture price-
related anomalies in the presence of idiosyncratic risk. The problem is that prices can
have an idiosyncratic risk component, whereas the CAPM pricing error cannot. Suppose
that the CAPM pricing error truly is a result of neglected higher-order moments and
an investor tries to perform better than the CAPM. Investment strategies based on
price-related financial variables can then be outperformed by strategies based on the
CAPM beta.
The slope of the security market line and thus the size of the CAPM-anomalies
strongly depend on the dividend distribution and preference parameters. For reasonable
parameter values, the security market line is still too steep. In a sense the cross-sectional
puzzles are very similar to the equity premium puzzle. We find for example that
the security market line becomes flatter for increasing risk aversion and increasing
consumption volatility. A higher level of risk aversion and consumption volatility are
also known to increase the equity premium. Possible explanations of the high equity
premium in the literature might therefore also explain the size of CAPM-anomalies.
Our discussion of CAPM-anomalies in the cross-section of stock returns is based on
a simple two-period economy with a specific correlation structure of dividends. An
interesting extension would be to introduce multiple time-periods so that for example
momentum could be discussed. Of course it would also be interesting to generalize the
results to a broader class of correlation structures.
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3.5 Appendix
Derivation of the Expectation:
In the proofs we often encounter expectations of the form E
h
ea∆y+b(∆y)
2
i
with different
coefficients a and b and ∆y ∼ N (µ− y0,σ2). Here we show the common derivation
of this expectation using the completion of the square method.
E

ea∆y+b(∆y)
2

=
1
σ
p
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
ea∆y+b(∆y)
2
e−
((∆y−(µ−y0))2
2σ2 d∆y
=
1
σ
p
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e
− 1
2

1
σ2
−2b(∆y)2−2 aσ2+(µ−y0)
1−2bσ2 ∆y+
(µ−y0)2
1−2bσ2

d∆y
=
1
σ
p
2pi
e
− 1
2

1
σ2
−2b (µ−y0)2
1−2bσ2 −

aσ2+(µ−y0)
1−2bσ2
2∫ ∞
−∞
e
− 1
2

1
σ2
−2b∆y− aσ2+(µ−y0)
1−2bσ2
2
d∆y.
The integrand is proportional to a normal probability density function with mean
aσ2+(µ−y0)
1−2bσ2 and standard deviation
Æ
σ2
1−2bσ2 . The expectation therefore is equal to
E

ea∆y+b(∆y)
2

=
1p
1− 2bσ2 e
− 1
2

1
σ2
−2b (µ−y0)2
1−2bσ2 −

aσ2+(µ−y0)
1−2bσ2
2
=
1p
1− 2bσ2 e
1
2σ2
(aσ2+(µ−y0))2
1−2bσ2 − 12σ2 (µ−y0)2.

Proof of Proposition 3.1:
The price-dividend ratio of an asset of type ρ is
qρ
Dρ0
= E

δ

c0
c1
γ Dρ1
Dρ0

= δE

e−γ(y1−y0)−
γ
2
σ2ρ(y
2
1−y20 )eρ(y1−y0)

.
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To shorten notation let us define ∆y ≡ y1 − y0 and ∆y ∼ N
 
µ− y0,σ2

. The price-
dividend ratio then is
qρ
Dρ0
= δE

e−γ∆y−
γ
2
σ2ρ∆y(y1+y0)eρ∆y

= δE

e−γ∆y−
γ
2
σ2ρ((∆y)2+2y0∆y)eρ∆y

= δE

e(ρ−γ−γσ2ρ y0)∆y−
γ
2
σ2ρ(∆y)
2

.
Using the formula for the expectation we obtain
qρ
Dρ0
=
δÆ
1+ γσ2
ρ
σ2
e
1
2σ2
((ρ−γ−γσ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1+γσ2ρσ
2 − 12σ2 (µ−y0)2.

Proof of Proposition 3.2:
The expected return of an asset of type ρ is
E [Rρ] = E

Dρ1
qρ

=
E

eρ∆y

Dρ0
qρ
=
Æ
1+ γσ2
ρ
σ2
δ
e
ρ(µ−y0)+ 12ρ2σ2− 12σ2
((ρ−γ−γσ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1+γσ2ρσ
2 +
1
2σ2
(µ−y0)2
.
The price-dividend of the market portfolio is
qM
DM0
= E

δ

c0
c1
γ DM1
DM0

= δE

e(1−γ)(y1−y0)+
1−γ
2
σ2ρ(y
2
1−y20 )

= δE

e(1−γ)∆y+
1−γ
2
σ2ρ∆y(y1+y0)

= δE

e(1−γ)∆y+
1−γ
2
σ2ρ((∆y)2+2y0∆y)

= δE

e(1−γ)(1+σ2ρ y0)∆y+
1−γ
2
σ2ρ(∆y)
2

.
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Using the formula for the expectation we obtain
qM
DM0
=
δÆ
1− (1− γ)σ2
ρ
σ2
e
1
2σ2
((1−γ)(1+σ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1−(1−γ)σ2ρσ2
− 1
2σ2
(µ−y0)2
.
Therefore the expected return on the market portfolio is
E

RM

= E

DM1
qM

=
E

e∆y+
1
2
σ2ρ(y
2
1−y20 )

DM0
qM
=
E

e(1+σ
2
ρ y0)∆y+
1
2
σ2ρ(∆y)
2

DM0
qM
=
Æ
1− (1− γ)σ2
ρ
σ2
δ
Æ
1−σ2
ρ
σ2
e
1
2σ2
((1+σ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1−σ2ρσ2
− 1
2σ2
((1−γ)(1+σ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1−(1−γ)σ2ρσ2 .
The riskless rate is
R f =
1
E
h
δ

c0
c1
γi
=
1
δE

e−γ(y1−y0)−
γ
2
σ2ρ(y
2
1−y20 )

=
1
δE

e−γ∆y−
γ
2
σ2ρ∆y(y1+y0)

=
1
δE

e−γ∆y−
γ
2
σ2ρ((∆y)2+2y0∆y)

=
1
δE

e−γ(1+σ2ρ y0)∆y−
γ
2
σ2ρ(∆y)
2
 .
Using the formula for the expectation we obtain
R f =
Æ
1+ γσ2
ρ
σ2
δ
e
− 1
2σ2
(−γ(1+σ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1+γσ2ρσ
2 +
1
2σ2
(µ−y0)2
.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3:
The CAPM beta βρ is
βρ =
Cov
 
Rρ, RM

Var
 
RM
 = qM
qρ
Cov
 
Dρ1 , D
M
1

Var
 
DM1

=
qM
qρ
E

e(1+ρ)y1+
1
2
σ2ρ y
2
1
− E [eρ y1]Ee y1+ 12σ2ρ y21
E

e2y1+σ
2
ρ y
2
1
− Ee y1+ 12σ2ρ y212
=
qM
qρ
e(ρ−1)y0−
1
2
σ2ρ y
2
0
E

e(1+ρ+σ
2
ρ y0)∆y+
1
2
σ2ρ(∆y)
2
− Eeρ∆yEe(1+σ2ρ y0)∆y+ 12σ2ρ(∆y)2
E

e2(1+σ
2
ρ y0)∆y+σ
2
ρ(∆y)
2
− Ee(1+σ2ρ y0)∆y+ 12σ2ρ(∆y)22 .
Using the formula for the expectations and multiplying the numerator and denominator
by e
1
2σ2
(µ−y0)2 we obtain
βρ =
qM
qρ
e(ρ−1)y0−
1
2
σ2ρ y
2
0
e
1
2σ2
((1+ρ+σ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1−σ2ρσ2Æ
1−σ2ρσ2
− e
ρ(µ−y0)+ 12ρ2σ2+ 12σ2
((1+σ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1−σ2ρσ2Æ
1−σ2ρσ2
e
1
2σ2
(2(1+σ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1−2σ2ρσ2Æ
1−2σ2ρσ2
− e
1
σ2
((1+σ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1−σ2ρσ2
− 1
2σ2
(µ−y0)2
1−σ2ρσ2
.
Using the formula for the price-dividend ratio we obtain
βρ =
e
1
2σ2
((1−γ)(1+σ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1−(1−γ)σ2ρσ2Æ
1−(1−γ)σ2ρσ2
 e 12σ2 ((1+ρ+σ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))
2
1−σ2ρσ2Æ
1−σ2ρσ2
− e
ρ(µ−y0)+ 12ρ2σ2+ 12σ2
((1+σ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1−σ2ρσ2Æ
1−σ2ρσ2

e
1
2σ2
((ρ−γ−γσ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))2
1+γσ2ρσ
2Æ
1+γσ2ρσ
2
 e 12σ2 (2(1+σ2ρ y0)σ2+(µ−y0))
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1−2σ2ρσ2Æ
1−2σ2ρσ2
− e
1
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.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4:
The CCAPM beta βρcon is
βρcon =
Cov
 
Rρ, (RM)−γ

Cov
 
RM , (RM)−γ
 = qM
qρ
Cov

Dρ1 ,
 
DM1
−γ
Cov

DM1 ,
 
DM1
−γ
=
qM
qρ
E

e(ρ−γ)y1−
γ
2
σ2ρ y
2
1
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σ2ρ y
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where η is defined as η ≡ 1 + σ2
ρ
y0. Using the formula for the expectations and
multiplying the numerator and denominator by e
1
2σ2
(µ−y0)2 we obtain
βρcon =
qM
qρ
e(ρ−1)y0−
1
2
σ2ρ y
2
0
 e 12σ2 ((ρ−γη)σ2+(µ−y0))
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2
.
Using the formula for the price-dividend ratio we obtain
βρcon =
e
1
2σ2
((1−γ)ησ2+(µ−y0))2
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4Asset Pricing with Labor Income and Rare Disasters
The article by Mehra and Prescott (1985) has entailed a multiplicity of attempts to
explain the equity premium puzzle ever since its publication. A major obstacle in the
attempt to explain observed equity premia and riskless rates with Lucas (1978)-type
models is the low variability of consumption growth. In the presence of labor income,
the representative agents’ consumption equals labor income plus aggregate dividends.
While aggregate dividend growth exhibits substantial variability, labor income growth
varies very little. Since labor income constitutes the lion’s share of total consumption, it
is probably the main reason why the volatility of consumption growth is so low.
A natural approach to explain the equity premium puzzle is to question measured
consumption growth variability. For example Weil (1992) and Constantinides and Duffie
(1996) introduce heterogeneous agents and argue that the labor income risk of the
representative agent does not reflect the much higher labor income risk faced by an
individual consumer.
Another possible approach is to compensate for the low volatility of consumption by
tackling the skewness of the distribution. Rietz (1988), Barro (2006) and Martin (2013)
demonstrate that including low-probability economic disasters increases predicted
equity premia and decreases the riskless rate despite the low variability of consumption
growth. Disasters leave the first- and second-order moments of consumption growth
merely unchanged, but have a big impact on the skewness of the distribution. We show
that the impact of introducing rare disasters on equity premia and riskless rates heavily
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depends on the labor income to consumption ratio. Furthermore, we separate and
analyze the channels through which disasters raise equity premia and lower riskless
rates.
Rare disasters affect the model in three ways. First, the decline in mean consumption
growth and increase in volatility during times of disaster are hard to gauge. Since
disasters occur very infrequently, shorter sample periods are likely to lead to a slight
overestimation of mean consumption growth and underestimation of the volatility.
Second, including low-probability events changes the distributional assumption on
dividends and labor income. Third, major economic shocks affect both labor income
and dividends simultaneously and introduce some correlation.
The impact of miscalibrated volatility has been previously studied by Weil (1992),
Constantinides and Duffie (1996), Gollier and Schlesinger (2002), and others. They
introduce additional risk to labor income and asset payoffs that arise from individual
consumers’ risk assessment. These kinds of risk are unobservable from aggregate
data. A market analyst would therefore underestimate the volatility of labor income
and dividends. Rare disasters imply labor income and dividend risk that a market
analyst would most probably underestimate as well. They therefore offer an alternative
explanation for miscalibrated risk.
Rietz (1988), Barro (2006) and Martin (2013) study the effect of changing the
distributional assumption on consumption growth. Our paper is most closely related
to Martin (2013). Martin (2013) studies the impact of economic disasters in a market
with multiple assets. While Martin (2013) models logarithmic dividend growth of
single assets by a normal distribution combined with a compound Poisson distribution,
we introduce labor income and model logarithmic aggregate dividend growth and
labor income growth by a normal distribution combined with a compound Poisson
distribution.
The main difficulty in such models as discussed by Martin (2013) and references
therein is the combination of consumption equaling the sum of lognormally distributed
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random variables and the structure of the stochastic discount factor implied by the
assumption of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Closed-form solutions for asset
prices are difficult to obtain in such a setting and have only been derived for special
cases. That is why we take a numerical approach as suggested by Martin (2013).
Our simulations show that accounting for rare disasters alters the predictions of the
model. Santos and Veronesi (2006) derive closed-form solutions in a market with labor
income and multiple assets and find that a high share of labor income to consumption
predicts low future aggregate returns consistent with data from 1948-2001. Chen and
Joslin (2012) show that the predictability changes in the data over the period from
1990-2010. A high share of labor income to consumption then predicts high future
aggregate returns. Chen and Joslin (2012) generalize the solution procedure of Martin
(2013) and allow for time-varying dividend and labor income risk. They find that the
predictability discovered by Santos and Veronesi (2006) almost vanishes, when the
volatilities and the correlation between labor income and dividends are low. We show
that including rare disasters can explain a change in predictability.
Unlike Martin (2013), Santos and Veronesi (2006) and Chen and Joslin (2012),
our model is placed in discrete time. Dividends are usually paid in lump sums and not
in rates. Therefore we prefer the discrete-time framework. Another possibility would
be to model cumulative dividends as a jump process in continuous time. According
to Aase (2008), there is some confusion about the continuous-time analogue of the
pricing formula in the literature. He presents a continous-time pricing formula that can
be viewed as a limiting case of the usual discrete-time formulation. Martin (2013) and
Santos and Veronesi (2006) use another continuous-time pricing formula, since they
model directly the dividend process and not cumulative dividends. We show that their
formulation can be viewed as a limiting case of the discrete-time framework as well.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, the economy is defined and a
convergence proof to the continuous-time formulation is given. In Section 4.2, we solve
the model for prices, returns and interest rates. Section 4.3 describes the simulation
setup and how the parameters are calibrated to data. In Section 4.4, we discuss the
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simulation results and analyze the different channels through which rare disasters
increase the equity premium and lower the riskless rate and how they affect stock return
predictability. Section 4.5 concludes. In order to improve readability, we moved all the
mathematical proofs to the appendix.
4.1 The Economy
First, we present the model in a discrete-time setting. Our specification of the exchange
economy is the discrete-time counterpart of the continuous-time model used by Martin
(2013). We will show that the continuous-time model can be viewed as a limiting case
of our model when the time interval tends to zero.
4.1.1 The discrete-time economy
We consider a Lucas (1978)-type one-good exchange economy where time is discrete.
Consumption is financed by labor income, the dividends of N − 1 risky assets indexed
by i = 2, . . . , N and discount bonds of all maturities. Labor income at time t is denoted
by D1t . The risky asset i pays a random dividend D
i
t and has ex-dividend price P
i
t at
time t = 0,1, . . . To ensure that dividends remain positive, we assume that Dit = e
y it .
(y it)t=0,1,... is a discrete-time stochastic process with initial value y¯
i
0. Logarithmic labor
income growth and dividend growth y it−y it−1 are independent and identically distributed
over time, according to the sum of a normal and a compound Poisson distribution. More
precisely, let y t ≡ (y1t , . . . , yNt )′ and
y t − y t−1 = M t +
Kt∑
k=1
J kt ,
where M t follows an N -variate normal distribution N (µ,Σ), Kt follows a Poisson
distribution Pois(λ) and J kt are N -dimensional independent and identically distributed
random variables. We will later use the compound Poisson distribution to model the
impact of economic disasters on labor income growth and dividend growth. Bonds pay
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one unit of consumption good at maturity. Let BTt denote the price of a bond at time t
with time to maturity T .
There is an infinitely-lived representative agent who maximizes a time-separable
utility function for lifetime consumption
Et
 ∞∑
s=0
1
(1+ β)s
u(Ct+s)

subject to the budget constraint
Ct +
N∑
i=2
P itθ
i
t +
∞∑
T=1
ψTt B
T
t = D
1
t +
N∑
i=2
(P it + D
i
t)θ
i
t−1 +
∞∑
T=1
ψTt−1B
T−1
t ,
where β denotes the time discount rate, Ct denotes consumption at time t and u(.) is
a CRRA utility function with coefficient of relative risk aversion γ. (θ it )i=2,...,N denote
the agent’s equity holdings and (ψTt )T=1,2,... denote the agent’s bond holdings in period
t. Et[.] denotes the conditional expectation given all information up to time t. The
information up to time t includes the labor income history and the securities’ dividend
and price histories. The consumption good is not storable, so that the representative
agent consumes the aggregate amount of dividends and labor income each period
Ct =
∑N
i=1 D
i
t .
The equilibrium price of asset i at time t follows from the Euler equations and is
given by
P it = Et
 ∞∑
s=1
1
(1+ β)s

Ct+s
Ct
−γ
Dit+s

. (4.1)
Before we further elaborate the discrete-time model, let us study the relation to the
continuous-time counterpart. We will demonstrate that the limiting pricing formula as
the time interval tends to zero is equal to the pricing formula in the continuous-time
model used by Martin (2013) and Santos and Veronesi (2006).
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4.1.2 The continuous-time limit
Let us first define a sequence of discrete-time models with decreasing time intervals
∆t = 1
n
. The representative agent’s lifetime utility is given by
Et

lim
T→∞
T−1∑
s=0
n−1∑
k=0

e−ρ(s+ kn)u(Ct+s+ kn )
1
n

+ e−ρT u(Ct+T )
1
n

,
where ρ denotes a time discount parameter with
e−ρ =
1
1+ β
.
The representative agent faces the budget constraint
Ct∆t +
N∑
i=2
P itθ
i
t = D
1
t ∆t +
N∑
i=2
(P it + D
i
t∆t)θ
i
t−∆t
in each period for all possible realizations of dividend streams. Since discount bonds
do not enter the Euler equations of risky asset holdings and do not affect asset prices,
we exclude them in this section to shorten notation.
We assume that logarithmic labor income and dividend growth are independent and
identically distributed according to
y t − y t−∆t = M t +
Kt∑
k=1
J kt ,
where M t follows an N -variate normal distribution N (µ∆t,Σ∆t), Kt is distributed
according to a Poisson distribution Pois(λ∆t) and J kt are N -dimensional independent
and identically distributed random variables.
Furthermore, we impose the transversality condition
lim
T→∞Et

Ct+T
Ct
−γ
P it+T

= 0 (4.2)
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to rule out any rational bubbles.
Proposition 4.1 The price of asset i at time t in the continuous-time limit as ∆t → 0 is
P it = Et
 ∞∫
t
e−ρs

Ct+s
Ct
−γ
Dit+sds
 ,
assuming that the transversality condition (4.2) holds.
We note that the ∆t = 1 describes the discrete-time case in Section 4.1.1. Hence,
Proposition 4.1 states that our discrete-time model is consistent with the continuous-time
model used by Martin (2013).
4.2 Prices, Returns and Interest Rates
In this section, we solve the model for prices, expected returns and interest rates
following the solution method of Martin (2013) and Chen and Joslin (2012). The main
problem is that we know too little about the distribution of consumption. In the standard
model without disasters, consumption is the sum of lognormal random variables. The
distribution of the sum of lognormal random variables is hitherto unknown. Even
though we know some properties of the resulting distribution, they do not suffice to
solve the model. The properties of the expectation operator also cannot solve the
problem because of the structure of the pricing formula under CRRA preferences.
Even though we have not managed to entirely solve for prices, expected returns and
interest rates, the solution techniques of Martin (2013) and Chen and Joslin (2012)
yield at least a partial solution to the problem. First, we will exchange the sum and
expectation in the pricing formula (4.1) and write the expression in the expectation in
terms of a function from which we know the Fourier transform. Replacing the function
by its inverse Fourier transform, we get an expression in terms of the product of powers
of dividends. Then we can apply the expectation operator, since the moment-generating
function of logarithmic dividends is known.
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We will state all our results in terms of the cumulant-generating function following
Martin (2013). For our specification of the logarithmic dividend growth distribution,
the cumulant-generating function is
c(θ ) ≡ logEeθ ′(y t−y t−1) = θ ′µ+ 1
2
θ ′Σθ +λ

E[eθ
′J]− 1 ,
where J can be any of the (J kt )k=1,2,... since they are identically distributed. The cumulant-
generating function is the same over each time period, since logarithmic dividend growth
is identically distributed as well.
The resulting formulas for asset prices, expected returns and interest rates depend
on
sit ≡
Dit
D1t + · · ·+ DNt
for i = 1, . . . , N . sit denotes the relative share of labor income to consumption for i = 1
and the relative share of dividends to consumption for i = 2, . . . , N . For notational
convenience we will work with the logarithmic dividends relative to labor income
instead
uit ≡ log

sit
s1t

= y it − y1t .
Let us introduce some more notation in order to get simpler expressions for the pricing
and return formulas. We define the (N − 1)-dimensional vector u t ≡ (u2t , . . . , uNt )′,
the N -dimensional vectors u+t ≡ (u1t , . . . , uNt )′ and γ ≡ (γ, . . . ,γ)′ and the (N − 1)× N
matrix
U ≡

−1 1 0 . . . 0
−1 0 1 ... ...
...
... . . . . . . 0
−1 0 . . . 0 1
 .
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Let α = (α1, . . . ,αN) be a multiindex and
Dαt = (D
1
t )
α1 . . . (DNt )
αN
Pαt = (P
1
t )
α1 . . . (DNt )
αN .
Thus, the prices and dividends of asset i can be described by an α with a one at the ith
entry and zeros elsewhere.
Proposition 4.2 The price-dividend ratio of an asset that pays the dividend stream Dαt is
Pαt
Dαt
= e−
γ′u+t
N

eu
1
t + · · ·+ euNt γ ∫
RN−1
F N
γ
(z)eiz
′u e
c(α− γN +iU ′z)
1+ β − ec(α− γN +iU ′z)dz,
where
F N
γ
(z) ≡ Γ (
γ
N
+ iz1 + · · ·+ izN−1)
(2pi)N−1Γ (γ)
N−1∏
k=1
Γ
 γ
N
− izk

.
The proof of Proposition 4.2 shows that prices are only finite if the condition 11+ β ec(α− γN +iQ′z)
 < 1 (4.3)
holds. From now on, we assume that the finiteness condition (4.3) holds for all assets.
We introduce the same notation for asset returns as for prices and dividends
Rαt+1 = (R
1
t+1)
α1 . . . (RNt+1)
αN , where Rit+1 ≡
P it+1 − P it + Dit+1
P it
.
Proposition 4.3 then gives us an expression for expected returns in terms of relative
dividends.
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Proposition 4.3 The expected return of an asset that pays the dividend stream Dαt is
Et[R
α
t+1] =
 ∑
|m|=γ

γ
m

e(m−
γ
N )
′u+t Φαm + e
c(α)
!
Dαt
Pαt
,
where
Φαm ≡
∫
RN−1
F N
γ
(z)eiz
′u t ec(α−
γ
N +iU
′z)(ec(α−
γ
N +m+iU
′z) − 1)
1+ β − ec(α− γN +iU ′z) dz.
Next, let us consider a zero-coupon bond BTt at time t that pays one unit of consumption
good T periods later. Let Yt(T ) be the yield to maturity t + T at time t, which is defined
by
BTt =
1
(1+Yt(T ))(T−t) .
Proposition 4.4 gives us expressions for the bond yield and the risk-free rate R ft+1 from
time t to t + 1 in terms of relative dividends.
Proposition 4.4 The yield of a zero-coupon bond with time to maturity T is
Yt(T ) = (1+ β)
e−
γ′u+t
N (eu1t + · · ·+ euNt )γ ∫
RN−1
F N
γ
(z)eiz′u t ec(−
γ
N +iU
′z)Tdz
 1
T
− 1.
The risk-free rate is
R ft+1 =
(1+ β)
e−
γ′u+t
N (eu1t + · · ·+ euNt )γ ∫
RN−1
F N
γ
(z)eiz′u t ec(−
γ
N +iU
′z)dz
− 1.
We did not manage to solve the integrals in Proposition 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 so far. All the
simulations in the following sections rely on numerical integration.
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4.3 Simulation Setup
Since the multiple integrals in Proposition 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 are computationally intensive,
we restrict ourselves to aggregate dividends instead of modeling the dividend process of
single assets40. From now on, let swt denote the share of labor income on consumption.
Let µ = (µw,µd)′ and
Σ =
σ2w 0
0 σ2d
 .
Further, let (J kt )k=1,2,... be normally distributed random variables with mean µ
J =
(µJ ,µJ)′ and covariance matrix
ΣJ =
σ2J 0
0 σ2J
 .
In the following, we will restate the formulas for prices, expected excess returns and
interest rates in terms of the labor income to consumption ratio and the aggregate
dividend to consumption ratio.
4.3.1 Prices and returns with labor income and aggregate dividends
In the context of labor income and aggregate dividends, Proposition 4.2 gives us the
aggregate market capitalization to aggregate dividend ratio. The formula reduces to
Pt
Dt
=

2cosh
ut
2
γ ∞∫
−∞
Fγ(z)eizut e
c(− γ
2
−iz,1− γ
2
+iz)
1+ β − ec(− γ2−iz,1− γ2+iz) dz,
40Note that the results do not necessarily carry over to the case where the dividends of single assets
are modeled by the same process as aggregate dividends in our simulation setup. The distribution of
aggregate dividends may then follow a very different process.
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where
ut = ln

swt
1− swt

.
Proposition 4.3 then gives us the expected returns on the aggregate stock market. The
return formula can be simplified to
Et[Rt+1] =
γ∑
m=0
 
γ
m

e−mut
∞∫
−∞
h(z)(ec(−
γ
2
+m−iz,1+ γ
2
−m+iz) − 1)dz
γ∑
m=0
 
γ
m

e−mut
∞∫
−∞
h(z)dz
+ ec(0,1)
Dt
Pt
,
where
h(z) ≡ Fγ(z) e
izut ec(−
γ
2
−iz,1− γ
2
+iz)
1+ β − ec(− γ2−iz,1− γ2+iz) .
Proposition 4.4 gives us the yield on a zero-coupon bond with time to maturity T
Yt(T ) = (1+ β)
(2cosh(ut
2
))γ
∞∫
−∞
Fγ(z)eizut ec(− γ2−iz,− γ2+iz)T dz
 1
T
− 1.
The long rate is
lim
T→∞Yt(T ) = maxθ∈[− γ
2
, γ
2
]
(1+ β)e−c(−
γ
2
+θ ,− γ
2
−θ ) − 1.
Comparing the formulas for the yield of a zero-coupon bond in discrete time and
continuous time, the long rate follows directly from the results in continuous time
derived by Martin (2013). Note that the long rate is independent of the relative shares
of labor income and aggregate dividends to consumption.
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4.3.2 Calibration to data
The data on aggregate dividends and labor income are obtained from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. We follow the approach of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) to define
labor income and measure labor income as compensation of employees plus personal
current transfer receipts less contributions for government social insurance and taxes.
Taxes are defined as personal current taxes adjusted by the ratio of wage and salary
disbursements to the sum of wage and salary disbursements, proprietors’ income, rental
income and personal income receipts on assets.
Dividends are defined as personal dividend income less taxes. Taxes are calculated
analogously as for labor income. Both time series are quarterly and our sample period
includes the years 1948− 2007. The labor income and aggregate dividend series are
deflated by the implicit PCE deflator with base year 2005 and adjusted for population
growth.
In our model, consumption equals labor income plus aggregate dividends. It differs
from the more common measure of consumption that uses nondurable goods plus
services. However, the time series of our measure of consumption and the time series of
nondurable goods and services move very closely. The annualized mean consumption
growth rate implied by our definition using labor income and dividends is 2.4% and is
about the same as the 2.3% mean growth rate of nondurable goods plus services. The
standard deviation of 2.0% is higher than the 1.0% we would get with the definition of
nondurable goods plus services.
Prices, expected returns and interest rates depend considerably on the relative share
of labor income to consumption. Figure 4.1 plots the relative share of labor income to
consumption over time. We see that consumption is financed primarily by labor income.
The relative share of labor income varies between 91% and 97%.
The disaster parameters are chosen as in Martin (2013). The frequency of low-
probability events λ is set to 0.017 and complies with the frequency estimated in the
empirical analysis of Barro (2006). A major decline in consumption arises around once
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Figure 4.1: This plot shows the labor income to consumption ratio over time. The data
is quarterly and includes the sample period from 1948 to 2007.
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every sixty years. The mean and standard deviation of the disaster size are −0.38
and 0.25. They approximately match the disaster size distribution estimated by Barro
(2006). The size distribution parameters should be interpreted with caution, since Barro
(2006) estimates declines in output growth rates rather than consumption growth rates.
However, he selects for events that were accompanied by a decline in consumption
growth to better estimate the decline in consumption growth rates.
The remaining parameters to specify are the time preference rate β and the coefficient
of relative risk aversion γ. We choose values for β that match a long rate of 7% for
given values of γ as in Martin (2013). For γ, we choose possible positive integer values
that satisfy the finiteness condition (4.2) and for which the implied β is positive.
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4.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we present and analyze the simulation results of the price-dividend
ratio41, expected excess returns and riskless rates. The plots show the results for all
possible values of the labor income to consumption ratio sw. However, our discussion
of the results will mainly focus on values of sw equal to 0.9 and above. Figure 4.1 in
Section 4.3.2 shows that the labor income to consumption ratio never went below 0.9
over the period 1948-2007.
4.4.1 Main results
First, let us compare the model with rare disasters to the standard model with lognormal
labor income and lognormal aggregate dividends. The only reasonable values for γ in
the standard model are one and two. For higher coefficients of relative risk aversion,
we would need negative rates of time preference β to match the targeted long rate.
Including disasters, γ can take values up to 10 and still imply positive rates of time
preference. We only present simulation results for values up to 6. When γ equals 6, the
model already generates expected equity premia that are too high and negative riskless
rates. Table 4.1 summarizes our parameter specification.
The simulation results of the price-dividend ratio, expected excess returns and
riskless rates obtained from the model with and without disasters are plotted in Figure
4.2. The plots show that the price-dividend ratio increases in the labor income to
consumption ratio sw for large values of sw in both models.
When dividends account for a small portion of consumption, fluctuations in the
dividend stream have a smaller impact on the agent’s consumption path. The agent
demands less compensation for holding equity, which drives prices up. This relation is
consistent with the results from the model of Santos and Veronesi (2006). Including
41We will use the terms market capitalization to aggregate dividends ratio and price-dividend ratio
interchangeably, since the aggregate stock market is modeled by a single asset in our model.
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Table 4.1: This table shows the parameters used for simulation. The mean µl and
standard deviation σl of the labor income growth rate and the mean µd and standard
deviation σd of the aggregate dividend growth rate are estimated using quarterly data
from 1948-2007. The frequency of rare disasters λ and the mean µJ and standard
deviation σJ of the disaster size distribution are chosen to match the empirical findings
of Barro (2006). All values are annualized. β Ln
γ=i denotes the time preference rates
chosen to match a long rate of 7% in the standard model without disasters when the
coefficient of relative risk aversion equals i. βDis
γ=i denotes the time preference rates
chosen to match a long rate of 7% in the model with disasters when the coefficient of
relative risk aversion equals i.
µl σl µd σd µJ σJ λ
0.0232 0.0199 0.0343 0.0667 -0.3800 0.2500 0.0170
β Ln
γ=1 β
Ln
γ=2 β
Dis
γ=1 β
Dis
γ=2 β
Dis
γ=3 β
Dis
γ=4 β
Dis
γ=5 β
Dis
γ=6
0.0356 0.0080 0.0442 0.0321 0.0327 0.0466 0.0904 0.1924
rare disasters lowers the price-dividend ratio, since it increases the risk of holding stocks.
The stock-price sensitivity to sw increases considerably for larger values of sw.
Expected excess returns in the standard model are basically zero. The problem is
that the possible choices of values for γ are very limited. If we account for rare disasters,
much higher values for γ still match the targeted long rate, support finite prices and
imply a positive time discount rate. Expected equity premia in the model with disasters
increase rapidly as γ increases. Values of γ between 4 and 5 suffice to generate equity
premia in the range of the usually reported historical averages around 6% to 7%.
The expected excess return plots are also interesting in connection with return
predictability. Santos and Veronesi (2006) find that a high share of labor income to
consumption predicts low future excess returns. Our findings in the simulations with
the standard model point in the same direction. The curve is downward sloping, even
though only slightly.
Expected excess returns in the model with rare disasters show a very different picture.
For higher values of relative risk aversion γ, the simulations suggest predictability in
the opposite direction. Expected excess returns are increasing in the labor income to
consumption ratio sw for high values of sw. Thus, a change in disaster risk might explain
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Figure 4.2: The plots on the left show the simulated price-dividend ratio, expected
excess returns and riskless rates plotted against the labor income share to consumption
for different coefficients of relative risk aversion γ in the standard model without
disasters. The plots on the right show the same in the model with economic disasters.
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a change in the predictability of excess returns with the labor income to consumption
ratio as documented by Chen and Joslin (2012).
The riskless rate in the standard model is very high and lies above 5%. The problem
is again the restriction on possible choices of γ. In the model with rare disasters, γ can
take again higher values. For γ between 4 and 5, we can generate riskless rates in the
usually reported range of historical averages around 1% to 2%.
4.4.2 Miscalibration of parameters
Large economic disasters are very rare and occur around once every sixty years on
average. Shorter data samples may not contain any major disaster. For example our
data set excludes the Great Depression and the two world wars. According to the
empirical study of Barro (2006), the only episodes of declines in real GDP by more than
15% in the twentieth century occurred during the Great Depression and the aftermath
of the Second World War. Our sample therefore does not allow to assess the impact
of rare disasters on the mean and variance of logarithmic labor income growth and
dividend growth. Since the mean growth rate is lower and the volatility is higher during
times of disaster, we probably overestimate the mean growth rate and underestimate
the volatility of the labor income growth rate and aggregate dividend growth rate.
Even if we would take a longer sample, we would probably underestimate the
volatility. The longer sample would contain probably one or two disasters, which do
not suffice to estimate the volatility during times of disaster. Thus, including disasters
in our model changes our calibration of the mean and variance of logarithmic dividend
growth and labor income growth. It decreases the mean and increases the variance.
For our disaster calibration, the resulting mean and standard deviation of logarithmic
labor income growth and dividend growth are reported in Table 4.2. While the mean
labor income growth rate declines by less than 1%, the standard deviation increases by
more than 4%.
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Table 4.2: This table shows the simulation parameters adjusted for rare disasters. The
mean µl and standard deviation σl of the labor income growth rate and the mean µd
and standard deviation σd of the aggregate dividend growth rate are adjusted for the
occurence of rare disasters and compared to the unadjusted counterparts.
µl σl µd σd
With disasters 0.0167 0.0626 0.0278 0.0893
Without disasters 0.0232 0.0199 0.0343 0.0667
The simulation results are given in Figure 4.3. Previous articles like Weil (1992),
Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and Gollier and Schlesinger (2002) have studied the
impact of miscalibrated variance of labor income and dividends before. They find that
correcting for the underestimation of the variance can increase the equity premium.
In our setting, adjusting parameters for the overestimated mean and underestimated
variance leads to higher equity premia as well. However, the increase in expected excess
returns does not suffice to explain observed historical averages.
The model with adjusted parameters allows to attain lower values of the riskless rate
for larger values of γ that are not supported by the model with miscalibrated parameters.
The generated riskless rates still do not match historical averages.
4.4.3 Misspecification of the distribution
Modeling disastrous low-probability events requires a change in the distributional
assumption on logarithmic labor income growth and dividend growth. In the following,
we study the impact of replacing the normal distribution by the sum of a normal and a
compound Poisson distribution on the price-dividend ratio, expected excess returns and
interest rates. The resulting distribution is negatively skewed, which probably is the
main cause for changes in the results. We assume that disasters strike labor income and
aggregate dividends independently in order to analyze the effect from the change in
distribution separately from correlation effects.
Figure 4.4 compares the price-dividend ratio, expected excess returns and interest
rates in the model with disasters to the standard model with lognormal dividends and
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Figure 4.3: The plots on the left show the simulated price-dividend ratio, expected
excess returns and riskless rates plotted against the labor income share to consumption
when parameters are calibrated to data. The plots on the right show the same when
parameters are adjusted for the occurrence of rare disasters.
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Figure 4.4: The plots on the left show the simulated price-dividend ratio, expected
excess returns and riskless rates plotted against the labor income share to consumption
with normal growth rates. The plots on the right show the same with growth rates
distributed according to the sum of a normal and a compound Poisson distribution.
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labor income. The growth rate parameters in the model with lognormal growth are the
adjusted ones reported in Table 4.2. We note that we only plot curves for values of γ
up to 6, even though values higher than 6 are admissible in the model with disasters.
Higher values of γ lead to results outside the range of interest.
The plots show that prices become increasingly sensitive to changes in the labor
income to consumption ratio sw for larger values of sw as we increase the coefficient of
relative risk aversion γ. The expected excess return curve changes completely. For large
values of sw, expected excess returns become increasing in sw. A misspecification of
the labor income and dividend distribution may therefore lead to different conclusions
about the predictive power of the labor income to consumption ratio. The modified
labor income and dividend distributions allow to match substantially higher equity
premia by only slightly increasing γ.
Riskless rates decrease substantially for higher values of γ and sw. If the coefficient
of relative risk aversion is larger or equal to 5, riskless rates become even significantly
negative for large values of sw.
4.4.4 Correlation effects
Disasters usually hit labor income and aggregate dividends at around the same time.
That is why we assume that substantial declines occur simultaneously in labor income
and dividends. The following analysis compares the difference in results between
independent declines and simultaneous declines. Allowing the correlation between labor
income growth and dividend growth to be positive increases the risk of consumption.
Figure 4.5 shows the simulation results for the price-dividend ratio, expected excess
returns and riskless rates for the model with disasters striking labor income and aggre-
gate dividends independently and simultaneously. Prices increase more slowly for larger
values of the labor income share to consumption sw when disasters are correlated.
Expected excess returns become less sensitive to changes in sw when disasters in
labor income and aggregate dividends occur at the same time. They increase the
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Figure 4.5: The plots on the left show the simulated price-dividend ratio, expected
excess returns and riskless rates plotted against the labor income share to consumption
when disasters strike labor income and dividends independently. The plots on the right
show the same when disasters occur simultaneously.
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most compared to the uncorrelated case when the labor income share to consumption
and the dividend share to consumption are more or less balanced and there is more
diversification. Introducing positive correlation between labor income and dividends
lessens the reduction in risk due to diversification and thus leads to higher equity
premia.
The riskless rate decreases more slowly for larger values of the labor income to
consumption ratio sw when we introduce correlation. However, the impact of correlation
on the riskless rate is less pronounced.
4.5 Conclusion
We have studied the impact of including rare economic disasters into a Lucas (1978)-
type economy with labor income. Labor income and aggregate dividends are assumed
to be lognormally distributed if we neglect the existence of low-probability disastrous
events. Our simulations support the findings of Rietz (1988), Barro (2006) and Martin
(2013) that rare economic disasters can explain the high equity premium and the low
riskless rate in a model with labor income.
We analyze three channels through which the inclusion of rare disasters affect equity
premia and riskless rates. First, we study the impact of a miscalibration of distribution
parameters. Even though including rare disasters markedly raises labor income volatility,
the model with adjusted parameters fails to generate sufficiently high equity premia
and low riskless rates. Second, we analyze the impact of changing the distributional
assumption on labor income and aggregate dividends. Modifying the distribution and
imposing negative skewness allows for much higher equity premia and substantially
lower riskless rates. Third, we examine correlation effects. Since disasters strike labor
income and aggregate dividends more or less simultaneously, they introduce correlation
between the two variables in our model. The impact on equity premia and the riskless
rate is rather small in the range of the labor income to consumption ratio observed in
data. We conclude that it is crucial to specify the growth rate distributions correctly.
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Our results show that modeling rare disasters also yields new predictions about the
predictability of excess returns. In contrast to previous models without disasters, a
higher labor income to consumption ratio predicts higher excess returns in our model.
An interesting extension to our analysis would be to reassess our disaster calibration.
Currently, disasters are assumed to equally affect labor income and dividends. Our
disaster parameters are calibrated to the empirical findings about output declines
of Barro (2006). If declines in output have a different impact on labor income and
dividends, our model might be able to explain the higher equity premia and lower
riskless rates during recessions.
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4.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.1:
From the Euler equation of the representative agent’s optimization problem, we obtain
P it = e
−ρ∆t Et

Ct+∆t
Ct
−γ
(P it+∆t + D
i
t+∆t∆t)

. (4.4)
By forward iteration of equation (4.4), we get
P it =
T−1∑
s=0
n∑
k=1
e−ρ(s+ kn )Et
Ct+s+ kn
Ct
−γ
Dt+s+ kn
1
n

+e−ρT Et

Ct+T
Ct
−γ
P it+T

.
Taking the limits T → ∞ and n → ∞ and using the transversality condition (4.2), the
Riemann sum converges to the respective Riemann integral and we obtain the pricing
formula (4.3) in Proposition 4.1. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2:
Pαt = Et
 ∞∑
s=1
1
(1+ β)s

Ct+s
Ct
−γ
Dαt+s

= (Ct)
γ
∞∑
s=1
1
(1+ β)s
Et

Dαt+s
(Ct+s)γ

= (D1t + · · ·+ DNt )γ
∞∑
s=1
1
(1+ β)s
Et

Dαt+s
(D1t+s + · · ·+ DNt+s)γ

= (e y
1
t + · · ·+ e yNt )γ
∞∑
s=1
1
(1+ β)s
Et

eα
′y t+s
(e y1t+s + · · ·+ e yNt+s)γ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
(4.5)
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Let us define the logarithmic dividend growth of asset i between time t and s as
y˜ it,s ≡ y it+s − y it and the vector of changes in the dividend growth rate of all assets
y˜ t,s ≡ ( y˜1t,s, . . . , y˜Nt,s)′. Then
(I) = eα
′y t Et

eα
′ y˜ t,s
(e y
1
t + y˜
1
t,s + · · ·+ e yNt + y˜Nt,s)γ

= Dαt Et

eα
′ y˜ t,s
(e y
1
t + y˜
1
t,s + · · ·+ e yNt + y˜Nt,s)γ

. (4.6)
In a next step, we will rewrite the expression in the expectation in terms of a function
from which the Fourier transform is known (see Martin, 2013, pg. 54). Define the
(N − 1)× N matrix Q and the N -dimensional vectors q i and γ as
q ′1 ≡ (N − 1,−1, . . . ,−1), (4.7)
Q ≡

q ′2
...
q ′N
 ≡

−1 N − 1 −1 . . . −1
−1 −1 N − 1 ... ...
...
... . . . . . . −1
−1 −1 . . . −1 N − 1
 (4.8)
and
γ′ ≡ (γ, . . . ,γ). (4.9)
Using (4.7), (4.8) and (4.9), we can write (4.6) as
(I) = Dαt Et
 eα′ y˜ t,s
e
γ′(y t+ y˜ t,s)
N (e
q ′1(y t+ y˜ t,s)
N + · · ·+ e q
′
N (y t+ y˜ t,s)
N )γ

= Dαt e
− γ′ y tN Et
e(α− γN )′ y˜ t,s 1(e q ′1(y t+ y˜ t,s)N + · · ·+ e q ′N (y t+ y˜ t,s)N )γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I I)
 (4.10)
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The Fourier transform of (II) is known (see Martin, 2013, pg. 55). Using the Fourier
inversion theorem, we can write (4.10) as
(I) = Dαt e
− γ′ y tN Et
e(α− γN )′ y˜ t,s ∫
RN−1
G N
γ
(z)eiz
′Q(y t+ y˜ t,s)dz
 , (4.11)
where
G N
γ
≡ N N−2Γ (
γ
N
+ iz1 + · · ·+ izN−1)
(2pi)N−1Γ (γ)
N−1∏
k=1
Γ (
γ
N
+ iz1 + · · ·+ izN−1 − Nizk).
Applying Fubini’s theorem and exchanging the order of integration, expression (4.11)
becomes
(I) = Dαt e
− γ′ y tN
∫
RN−1
G N
γ
(z)eiz
′Qy t Et

e(α−
γ
N +iQ
′z)′ y˜ t,s

dz
= Dαt e
− γ′ y tN
∫
RN−1
G N
γ
(z)eiz
′Qy t ec(α−
γ
N +iQ
′z)sdz. (4.12)
Inserting (4.12) in (4.5), we get
Pαt
Dαt
= (e y
1
t + · · ·+ e yNt )γ
∞∑
s=1
e−
γ′ y t
N
(1+ β)s
∫
RN−1
G N
γ
(z)eiz
′Qy t ec(α−
γ
N +iQ
′z)sdz
= (e y
1
t + · · ·+ e yNt )γe− γ′ y tN
∫
RN−1
G N
γ
(z)eiz
′Qy t
∞∑
s=1

ec(α−
γ
N +iQ
′z)
1+ β
s
dz
= (e y
1
t + · · ·+ e yNt )γe− γ′ y tN
∫
RN−1
G N
γ
(z)eiz
′Qy t
ec(α−
γ
N +iQ
′z)
1+β
1− ec(α− γN +iQ′z)
1+β
dz
= (e
q ′1 y t
N + · · ·+ e q
′
N y t
N )γ
∫
RN−1
G N
γ
(z)
eiz
′Qy t ec(α−
γ
N +iQ
′z)
1+ β − ec(α− γN +iQ′z)dz (4.13)
98
Note that for the geometric series to converge, we need the following restriction 11+ β ec(α− γN +iQ′z)
 < 1. (4.14)
We will refer to the inequality (4.14) as the finiteness condition. If it is not satisfied,
the geometric series diverges and the asset’s price is infinite.
The price-dividend ratio (4.13) depends on the N realizations of the logarithmic
dividends y1t , . . . , y
N
t . We can rewrite (4.13) in terms of the N −1 logarithmic dividends
relative to the dividends of the first asset uit ≡ y it − y1t instead of y t . Let u t =
(u2t , . . . , u
N
t )
′ and u+t = (0, u2t , . . . , uNt )′. Let us replace the factor in front of the integral
in (4.13)
e−
γ′u+t
N (eu
1
t + · · ·+ euNt )γ
∫
RN−1
G N
γ
(z)eiz
′Qy t e
c(α− γN +iQ′z)
1+ β − ec(α− γN +iQ′z)dz. (4.15)
To write the integral in (4.15) in terms of u t , we need a change of variable. Let zˆ ≡ Bz,
where
B ≡

N − 1 −1 . . . −1
−1 N − 1 ... ...
... . . . . . . −1
−1 . . . −1 N − 1
 .
The inverse of B is
B−1 =
1
N

2 1 . . . 1
1 2 .. .
...
... . . . . . . 1
1 . . . 1 2
 .
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The determinant of B−1 can be determined using the matrix determinant lemma and is
equal to 1
N N−2 (see Martin, 2013, p. 55). With the change of variable, (4.15) becomes
e−
γ′u+t
N (eu
1
t + · · ·+ euNt )γ
∫
RN−1
G N
γ
(B−1 zˆ)
ei(B
−1 zˆ)′Qy t ec(α−
γ
N +iQ
′B−1 zˆ)
1+ β − ec(α− γN +iQ′B−1 zˆ)
d zˆ
N N−2
Using zˆk = Nzk − z1 − · · · − zN−1 and zˆ1 + · · ·+ zˆN−1 = z1 + · · ·+ zN−1, we get
G N
γ
=
N N−2
(2pi)N−1
Γ ( γ
N
+ izˆ1 + · · ·+ izˆN−1)
Γ (γ)
N−1∏
k=1
Γ (
γ
N
− izˆk).
Let us define U ≡ B−1Q. It follows that u t = Uy t . Hence, the price-dividend ratio
becomes
Pαt
Dαt
= e−
γ′u+t
N (eu
1
t + · · ·+ euNt )γ
∫
RN−1
F N
γ
(zˆ)ei zˆ
′u t e
c(α− γN +iU ′ zˆ)
1+ β − ec(α− γN +iU ′ zˆ)d zˆ,
where
F N
γ
(zˆ) ≡ G
N
γ
(B−1 zˆ)
N N−2 .

Proof of Proposition 4.3:
Let us derive the expected return based on our results in 4.6.
Et[R
α
t+1] = Et

Pαt+1 − Pαt + Dαt+1
Pαt

= Et

Pαt+1 − Pαt
Pαt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
+Et

Dαt+1
Pαt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I I)
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We start by calculating the expected capital gain (I). First recall the price formula from
(4.13).
Pαt = (e
y1t + · · ·+ e yNt )γe− γ′ y tN
∫
RN−1
eiz
′Qy t
G N
γ
(z)ec(α−
γ
N +iQ
′z)
1+ β − ec(α− γN +iQ′z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡hα(z)
Dαt dz
= (e y
1
t + · · ·+ e yNt )γ
∫
RN−1
e(α−
γ
N +iQ
′z)′y t hα(z)dz (4.16)
By applying the multinomial formula to (4.16), we get
Pαt =
∑
|m|=γ

γ
m
 ∫
RN−1
e(α−
γ
N +m+iQ
′z)′y t hα(z)dz,
where m is a multiindex. The expected prices of the next time step are
Et[P
α
t+1] =
∑
|m|=γ

γ
m
 ∫
RN−1
Et[e
(α− γN +m+iQ′z)′y t+1]hα(z)dz
=
∑
|m|=γ

γ
m
 ∫
RN−1
Et[e
(α− γN +m+iQ′z)′(y t+ y˜ t,t+1)]hα(z)dz
=
∑
|m|=γ

γ
m
 ∫
RN−1
e(α−
γ
N +m+iQ
′z)′y t ec(α−
γ
N +m+iQ
′z)hα(z)dz
Hence, the expected capital gains are
Et

Pαt+1 − Pαt
Pαt

=
Et[Pαt+1]− Pαt
Pαt
= Φα
Dαt
Pαt
, (4.17)
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where
Φα ≡ ∑
|m|=γ

γ
m
 ∫
RN−1
e(−
γ
N +m+iQ
′z)′y t (ec(α−
γ
N +m+iQ
′z) − 1)hα(z)dz.
Now let us derive the expected dividend gain (II)
Et

Dαt+1
Pαt

=
Et[Dα1 ]
Pαt
= ec(α)
Dαt
Pαt
. (4.18)
From (4.17) and (4.18) the expected return follows
Et[R
α
t+1] = (Φ
α + ec(α))
Dαt
Pαt
.
The expected return depends on the N realizations of the logarithmic dividends y1t , . . . , y
N
t .
We can apply the same change of variable as on the price-dividend ratio in 4.6 to ob-
tain an expression depending only on the N − 1 logarithmic dividends relative to the
dividends of the first asset.
Et[R
α
t+1] = (Φ
α + ec(α))
Dαt
Pαt
,
where
Φα =
∑
|m|=γ

γ
m

e(m−
γ
N )
′u+t
∫
RN−1
F N
γ
(zˆ)ei zˆ
′u t e
c(α− γN +iU ′ zˆ)(ec(α−
γ
N +m+iU
′ zˆ) − 1)
1+ β − ec(α− γN +iU ′ zˆ) d zˆ

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Proof of Proposition 4.4:
Let us derive the yield of a zero-coupon bond with maturity T .
B(T )t = Et

1
(1+ β)T

Ct+T
Ct
−γ
=
(Ct)γ
(1+ β)T
Et

1
(Ct+T )γ

=
(D1t + · · ·+ DNt )γ
(1+ β)T
Et

1
(D1t+T + · · ·+ DNt+T )γ

=
(e y
1
t + · · ·+ e yNt )γ
(1+ β)T
Et

1
(e y1t+T + · · ·+ e yNt+T )γ

(4.19)
The expectation in (4.19) is equal to the expectation (I) in (4.5) of 4.6 with α = 0 and
s = T . Inserting (4.12), we get
B(T )t =
1
(1+ β)T
(e y
1
t + · · ·+ e yNt )γe− γ′ y tN
∫
RN−1
G N
γ
(z)eiz
′Qy t ec(−
γ
N +iQ
′z)Tdz.
Applying the same change of variable as in 4.6 and 4.6, we obtain
B(T )t =
1
(1+ β)T
e−
γ′u+t
N (eu
1
t + · · ·+ euNt )γ
∫
RN−1
F N
γ
(zˆ)ei zˆ
′u t ec(−
γ
N +iU
′ zˆ)Td zˆ.
Now we can determine Yt(T ) from
1
(1+Yt(T ))T =
e−
γ′u+t
N (eu
1
t + · · ·+ euNt )γ
(1+ β)T
∫
RN−1
F N
γ
(zˆ)ei zˆ
′u t ec(−
γ
N +iU
′ zˆ)Td zˆ.
This is equivalent to
Yt(T ) = (1+ β)
e−
γ′u+t
N (eu1t + · · ·+ euNt )γ ∫
RN−1
F N
γ
(zˆ)ei zˆ
′u t ec(−
γ
N +iU
′ zˆ)Td zˆ
 1
T
− 1.
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The risk-free rate is accordingly
R ft+1 = Yt(1)
=
(1+ β)
e−
γ′u+t
N (eu1t + · · ·+ euNt )γ ∫
RN−1
F N
γ
(zˆ)ei zˆ
′u t ec(−
γ
N +iU
′ zˆ)d zˆ
− 1.

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